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Executive summary
Over the past decade, since the implementation of 
China’s ‘going abroad’ policy, mainland Chinese 
State-owned and private companies have significantly 
increased their interests in the resources and 
investment opportunities of the Congo Basin (CB), 
bringing new opportunities as well as potential social 
and environmental costs. This report is a synthesis of 
some main findings of preliminary scoping studies 
conducted by CIFOR and partners in Cameroon, 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Gabon. 
It focuses on how Chinese trade and investment in 
the forestry, mining and agricultural sectors might 
impact forests and forest-dependent communities 
in the heavily forested region. The report also 
relies on studies of trade and investment data and 
Chinese policies conducted by partners working 
remotely from China and Germany. All studies were 
conducted under the CIFOR project ‘Chinese trade 
and investment in Africa: Assessing and governing 
trade-offs to national economies, local livelihoods 
and forest ecosystems’,1 initiated in 2010. 
Cameroon, DRC and Gabon were selected for this 
study primarily because of the growing importance 
of the Chinese market for logs and sawnwood in 
Cameroon and Gabon; and, in DRC, a dramatic 
growth in mineral exports to China as well as 
a comparatively high dependency on Chinese 
investment. The scoping exercise included collection 
and review of documents and available statistics, 
key informant interviews and field visits to locations 
where Chinese projects of interest had been 
identified. It is a preliminary work, and primarily 
an exercise to develop and refine hypotheses to 
be tested through selection of specific sites for 
in-depth research. 
The scoping studies yielded useful results, including 
an increased understanding of the main trends in 
natural resources trade between the target countries 
and China, and the major land-based productive 
sectors targeted by Chinese investors. The studies 
also considered the role of national agencies tasked 
with promoting investment and overseeing corporate 
adherence to environmental and social requirements, 
1 See China’s trade and investment in Africa, CIFOR, Bogor, 
Indonesia. www.cifor.cgiar.org/China-Africa (May 2011).
and provided a better understanding of the informal 
processes surrounding investment and acquisition 
of land and other resources. The degree to which 
the report answers quantitative questions (extent of 
deforestation, jobs created, etc.) is limited and will 
require more targeted data collection. Future research 
phases, in which specific cases will be selected for 
in-depth study, will permit a more comparative 
assessment of Chinese vs. non-Chinese trade and 
investment in selected locations than was possible 
during the preliminary scoping stage.
Preliminary observations reveal that current Chinese 
investments in the CB region dwarf all prior 
figures and are likely to greatly expand material 
trade flows. In DRC, the Sicomines deal, a USD6 
billion investment, will bring major infrastructure 
developments in return for rights to mine a major 
copper deposit; however, the activities of small- to 
medium-sized Chinese companies engaged in small-
scale mining and buying from the informal sector 
are currently of greater concern for environmental 
and social impacts. In Gabon, Chinese companies 
in 2010 owned 121 concession permits to manage 
and log 2.67 million ha of forestland, which is more 
than 10% of Gabon’s dense forest area; however, their 
development and implementation of management 
plans to ensure sustainability and social responsibility 
has been slow. In contrast, in DRC, Chinese 
companies have not managed to adapt to changes 
in the Forest Law and have been excluded from the 
granting/renewal of concessionary rights. In DRC 
and Cameroon, Chinese agribusiness companies have 
recently been negotiating for parcels of agricultural 
land of 10 000 to 100 000 ha, for food and palm oil 
production projects. The initial land deals associated 
with these developments may not be in the best 
interest of local farmers with informal or customary 
tenure and usufruct rights over the same lands. 
In general, the preliminary studies found that: 
1. The involvement of Chinese companies, 
particularly in the small-scale and artisanal 
mining segments of the mining sector, is 
potentially a significant source of deforestation 
and especially forest degradation in areas that 
attract large numbers of migrant diggers. 
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2. In the forestry sector, Chinese companies have 
acquired substantial concessionary holdings 
in Gabon, some of which border on national 
parks. Our overview suggests that the activities 
of Chinese companies on the ground in Gabon 
need more in-depth study. The companies vary 
greatly in their compliance with legislation and 
other responsibility norms in their activities 
within the forest, and in their development and 
implementation of sustainable management 
plans. In all three countries, further study is 
needed of the articulations between Chinese 
companies and the informal timber sector, and 
a comparative approach is needed to determine 
the relative effects of the Chinese market and 
Chinese companies vs. other markets and non-
Chinese companies. 
3. In the agricultural sector, Chinese investment has 
not yet reached a level where a substantial impact 
is to be expected. However, such investments are 
planned for the future, and may materialise over 
the next few years. 
Further research is needed to measure the economic 
returns on Chinese investments, and systematically 
to assess their relative costs and benefits compared 
to other investors, including European, North 
American, South African and Australian companies. 
Initial results point to a need to better understand 
the efficacy of national, provincial and local laws 
and institutions and customary systems in ensuring 
the highest returns to society on investments while 
reducing and mitigating environmental and social 
costs. Further studies would include, for example, 
land and resource laws, investment promotion 
agencies and environmental oversight bureaus, 
and officials and local chiefs with authority to 
allocate land. In addition, the responsibilities 
of investors in CB countries need to be better 
defined, including banks, corporations, and, where 
relevant, foreign governments, in order to form and 
implement guidelines on responsible finance and 
project implementation.
Sommaire
Au cours de la dernière décennie, depuis la mise en 
œuvre de la politique d’expansion extérieure, qui 
vise à favoriser l’investissement chinois à l’étranger, 
l‘intérêt des entreprises chinoises — tant publiques 
que privées — pour les ressources naturelles et 
d’autres opportunités d’investissement dans le Bassin 
du Congo a considérablement augmenté. Ce rapport 
est une synthèse de trois études de cadrage menées 
par le CIFOR et ses partenaires sur les activités 
de commerce et d’investissements chinois dans les 
secteurs forestier, minier, et agricole au Cameroun, 
en République Démocratique du Congo (RDC) et 
au Gabon. Les impacts potentiels de ces activités 
sur les forêts et les communautés riveraines sont 
également passés en revue. Des études menées par 
des partenaires en Chine et en Allemagne viennent 
compléter les diagnostics établis dans les trois pays 
concernés. Toutes ces études ont été menées dans le 
cadre du projet du CIFOR intitulé «Chinese trade and 
investment in Africa: Assessing and governing trade-
offs to national economies, local livelihoods and forest 
ecosystems », lancé en 2010. 
Cette étude a sélectionné le Cameroun, la RDC et le 
Gabon pour les raisons suivantes: 
•	 l’importance croissante du marché chinois dans 
le secteur et le commerce du bois d’œuvre au 
Cameroun et au Gabon;
•	 une augmentation spectaculaire des exportations 
de minerais de la RDC vers la Chine ainsi qu’une 
dépendance relativement élevée de ce pays des 
investissements chinois dans ce secteur. 
L’évaluation s’est faite par le truchement de collecte 
et d’examen des documents et des statistiques 
disponibles, des interviews des principaux 
informateurs, et des visites sur le terrain là où 
des projets chinois majeurs ont été identifiés. Il 
s’agit d’un travail préliminaire pour développer et 
affiner les hypothèses que le projet testera dans une 
seconde phase par une recherche en profondeur 
dans une sélection de sites stratégiques dans les trois 
mêmes pays.
Ces études préliminaires ont ressorti plusieurs 
informations utiles et contribuent à une meilleure 
compréhension des principales tendances liées 
au commerce des ressources naturelles entre les 
pays cibles et la Chine, des principaux secteurs 
économiques ciblés par des investisseurs chinois, du 
rôle des agences nationales dans la promotion de 
l’investissement et chargées de contrôler l’adhésion 
des entreprises aux exigences environnementales et 
sociales, ainsi que des processus informels jouant 
sur l’investissement et l’acquisition de terres ou 
d’autres ressources. Ces informations demeurent 
toutefois essentiellement qualitatives et mériteront 
d’être complétées par une collecte de données plus 
ciblées. La future phase de recherche se basera sur des 
études approfondies pour un petit nombre de sites 
stratégiques et permettra une évaluation comparative 
des effets liés au commerce et à l’investissement 
chinois et non-chinois dans ces zones. 
Les observations préliminaires révèlent que les 
investissements chinois dans la région du Bassin du 
Congo ont beaucoup augmenté, ce qui se traduira 
probablement une croissance considérable des 
flux de ressources naturelles vers l’Asie. En RDC, 
l’accord Sicomines, un investissement de 6 milliards 
de dollars visant l’exploitation d’un important 
gisement de cuivre, devrait apporter une amélioration 
considérable des infrastructures. Cependant, les 
activités des PME chinoises travaillant dans des mines 
à petite échelle et/ou achetant des minerais provenant 
de l’extraction informelle, sont préoccupantes en 
termes d’impacts environnementaux et sociaux. 
Au Gabon, les entreprises chinoises détiennent 
actuellement 121 concessions forestières, ce qui 
représente des droits d’exploitation sur environ 2,67 
millions d’hectares, soit plus de 10% de la superficie 
de forêt dense du Gabon. Néanmoins, l’engagement 
de certaines de ces sociétés dans l’élaboration 
et la mise en œuvre de plans d’aménagement 
forestier pour assurer leurs responsabilités sociale et 
environnementale est encore assez lent. En revanche, 
en RDC, les entreprises chinoises n’ont pas réussi à 
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s’adapter aux changements du code forestier et ont 
été exclues de l’octroi ou de la reconversion des titres 
de concession. En RDC et au Cameroun, des sociétés 
agro-industrielles chinoises ont négocié le droit 
d’exploiter des parcelles de terres agricoles à l’ordre 
de 10.000 à 100.000 hectares pour développer des 
cultures vivrières ou des palmeraies. Les transactions 
associées à ces projets agricoles ne sont pas toujours 
dans le meilleur intérêt des communautés locales 
occupant ces terres de façon formelle ou informelle. 
En général, les études préliminaires ont permis de 
constater que: 
1. La participation des entreprises chinoises dans 
le secteur informel ou artisanal de l’exploitation 
minière à petite échelle est potentiellement une 
source importante de déforestation et/ou de 
dégradation des forêts, en particulier dans les 
zones qui attirent un grand nombre de mineurs 
migrants.
2. Dans le secteur forestier, les entreprises chinoises 
ont acquis des concessions importantes au 
Gabon, dont certaines jouxtent des parcs 
nationaux. Notre aperçu suggère qu’il y a une 
nécessité d’effectuer une étude plus approfondie 
de leurs activités, qui varient considérablement 
au regard de leur conformité à la législation et 
aux normes d’aménagement forestier durable. 
Dans les trois pays, il est nécessaire de poursuivre 
l’étude des liens entre les entreprises chinoises 
et le secteur informel du bois. Dans cette 
perspective, une approche comparative est 
nécessaire pour déterminer les effets relatifs des 
commandes et des activités chinoises par rapport 
à leurs concurrents. 
3. Dans le secteur agricole, les investissements 
chinois n’ont pas encore atteint un niveau où 
un impact substantiel est à prévoir. Toutefois, 
des investissements importants pourraient se 
concrétiser au cours des prochaines années. 
D’autres recherches sont nécessaires pour mesurer 
les retombées économiques des investissements 
chinois et évaluer leurs coûts et avantages relatifs par 
rapport à d’autres investisseurs européens, américains, 
sud-africains et australiens, entre autres. Deux 
facteurs contextuels doivent être davantage analysés 
pour améliorer le rendement des investissements 
chinois sur la société, tout en mitigeant leurs 
coûts environnementaux et sociaux : d’une part, 
l’application effective de la législation nationale, 
provinciale et locale et, d’autre part, le système 
institutionnel qui combinant structures formelles et 
systèmes coutumiers. En outre, il existe un besoin de 
mieux définir les responsabilités des investisseurs – 
comme les banques, les sociétés publiques et privées, 
et, le cas échant, les gouvernements étrangers – dans 
les pays du Bassin du Congo dans l’élaboration et la 
mise en œuvre de lignes directrices sur le financement 
responsable et la mise en œuvre des projets de 
développement.
1. Introduction
Over the past decade, in line with trends throughout 
Africa, the magnitude of Chinese interest in Congo 
Basin (CB) resources and investment opportunities 
has soared, and the now familiar debate about the 
economic benefits to Africans of cooperation with 
China vs. the potential environmental and social 
costs of working with the colossal newcomer are 
applicable here, as they are in other regions of the 
continent. However, certain features of the CB and 
China’s interests there lead to a particular set of 
questions relevant to the future of the region’s forests 
and the wellbeing of forest-dependent people. 
The most prominent feature of interest to 
international forestry researchers is the extent of 
remaining natural forests in the region (Figure 1). 
Together, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Central 
African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC), Gabon and Equatorial Guinea 
contain nearly 162 million ha of dense humid 
tropical forest and ca. 30 million ha of miombo 
woodlands (Eba’a Atyi et al. 2010). The forest 
ecosystems throughout the greater central African 
region are the main source of food, produced on 
forest farms, for more than 30 million people, while 
more than 50 million people depend in one way or 
another on non-timber forest products (Justice et al. 
2001). The most obvious rationale for the present 
study is that 70% of Africa’s log exports to China are 
from the CB, and in 2009, Gabon was China’s fifth 
largest supplier of logs (Huang et al. 2010). 
 
Figure 1. Chinese trade and investment in the Congo Basin region. Map of the Congo Basin region, with forest 
cover and figures by country showing trade and investment volumes. 
Sources: Landcover map, GlobCover (2008); trade and investment figures, Engelhardt (2010)
© ESA GlobCover Project, led by MEDIAS-France
Cameroon
Trade: US$ 0.5 billion
Investment: US$ 25 million
Equatorial Guinea
Trade: US$ 2.3 billion
Investment: US$ 62 million
Gabon
Trade: US$ 1.8 billion
Investment: US$ 100 million
Republic of Congo
Trade: US$ 3.7 billion
Investment: US$ 115 million
Democratic Republic of Congo
Trade: US$ 1.6 billion
Investment: US$ 397 million
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Centre for Development (TTRECED); and, in 
DRC, a CIFOR researcher worked with a colleague 
from the University of Kinshasa, with essential field 
assistance and orientation from the Association 
contre l’impunité pour les droits humains (ACIDH), 
a human rights NGO in Katanga Province with a 
background of work on mining issues. 
This synthesis draws loosely from those three reports, 
as well as from reports produced by project partners, 
the University of Leipzig’s African Studies Institute 
and the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF)—China 
and East Asia Node. University of Leipzig’s report is 
an overview of trade and investment data drawn from 
international databases, and the Beijing reports are 
overviews of Chinese data on trade and investment to 
Africa as well as the policies governing them. Initial 
observations derived from these studies include the 
following points.
Chinese investment and aid is important to the 
economies of the target countries, but still represents 
a small proportion of overall foreign investment. 
Much Chinese aid appears to be politically 
motivated, since it is targeted to projects identified 
by the head of State and it is often also the executive 
branch that negotiates with China for large deals. 
In the forestry sector, Chinese companies have 
acquired large concessions in Gabon, some of which 
border on national parks; this requires more study of 
activities within the forest with the development and 
implementation of sustainable management plans. 
Throughout the region, more attention needs to be 
paid to companies’ engagement with the informal 
sector. In mining, Chinese companies’ involvement 
in small-scale and artisanal extraction is potentially 
a significant source of deforestation and especially 
forest degradation in areas that attract large numbers 
of migrant diggers. In the agricultural sector, Chinese 
investment has not reached a level where a substantial 
impact is to be expected. However, such investments 
are planned for the future, and may materialise over 
the next few years. 
Chinese trade has a tendency to interface with 
small-scale local actors, such as artisanal miners 
and loggers, which means the direct benefits may 
therefore be distributed relatively widely. However, 
those benefits come with increased costs in the form 
of potential labour and even human rights abuses 
associated with vulnerable people being involved 
However, while the timber industry may be the 
industrial sector with the most obvious direct 
relationship to forest management, other sectors 
often occupy the same spaces and also have great 
impacts on forest extent and quality. Mining and 
agriculture require tree and soil removal and therefore 
have their own direct impacts in forested zones. In 
DRC, with its great mineral endowment and heavy 
economic reliance on mining, many concessions are 
located within forested areas (Bélanger and Mertens 
2011). China’s already substantial interests in CB 
minerals are set to expand greatly with multibillion 
dollar mining investments agreed between China and 
the region’s governments. 
Chinese agricultural imports from Africa, with the 
exception of cotton from Cameroon’s drier north, 
are mostly sourced from other parts of Africa. 
However, a number of pilot projects and planned 
investments with Chinese capital suggest the 
oncoming development of land to grow palm oil, 
rice and other products. With a growing population 
and complicated land tenure involving overlapping 
legal and customary systems, the means through 
which foreign companies acquire rights to occupy 
and develop lands is central to the future wellbeing of 
people in the region.
Forestry, mining and agricultural development 
in the heavily forested CB region requires new 
transportation and energy infrastructure. Throughout 
the region, with both multilateral (e.g. World Bank) 
and Chinese development funds, Chinese contractors 
are active in road, railroad and hydroelectric 
construction. While certainly crucial to the region’s 
economic development, improved access to resources 
and land is associated with deforestation, and 
the movement of people following new routes is 
associated with particular social problems which 
require planning and mitigation. 
CIFOR worked with national researchers to produce 
three preliminary scoping reports. The reports 
provided a basic understanding of the scope and 
magnitude of Sino-African trade and investment in 
the three focal countries, and an initial impression of 
the potential associated ecological and social effects. 
In Gabon, research was conducted and processed 
by researchers from Brainforest, an environmental 
NGO; in Cameroon, CIFOR researchers worked 
with a local consultancy, the Technical Training 
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in dangerous industries conducted on a small scale 
with little oversight. In this regard, Chinese trade 
is likely not different from other foreign ethnic 
groups engaging with the region’s informal sectors. 
Chinese investment, meanwhile, is increasingly 
subject to similar types of social and environmental 
safeguards employed by Western companies. 
Increasingly, Chinese investment banks require 
approved environmental and social assessments as 
well as mitigation plans. However, in other studies 
specifically targeting Chinese actors, cases of poor 
labour practices such as low wages, long hours and 
bad working conditions abound. The ability and will 
of Chinese vs. national producer country institutions 
to govern the investment impacts need to be more 
deeply explored. 
The next section will describe the methodology of 
the country selection (Cameroon, Gabon and DRC) 
and initial commodities of interest for the scoping 
exercise, followed by a brief historical overview of 
Chinese involvement in those countries. Finally, 
the main findings of the exercise will be presented 
and discussed.
2.1 Selection of countries for 
preliminary scoping 
In order to select three CB countries for preliminary 
scoping exercises, the project team reviewed available 
data on trade and investment between CB countries 
and China. The countries initially considered 
included Cameroon, CAR, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville. The countries were 
examined according to various criteria, including 
forest cover and forest cover change (Table 2), total 
trade with China, dependency on Chinese trade, key 
commodities exported to China as a share of total 
exports to China and current investment dependency 
(the percentage of Chinese foreign direct investment 
(FDI) as a share of total FDI stock). Based on the 
overview of these data, the team selected Cameroon, 
DRC and Gabon for inclusion in the scoping studies. 
Initially, the project team inspected data on all 
top commodities exported from the CB countries 
to China, and discussed which were likely to be 
of interest in their impact on forests. The top 
commodities in value exported from the region 
to China are mineral fuels (oil), mineral ores and 
metals (including copper, cobalt and iron), wood 
products and cotton. However, because oil is mostly 
produced offshore2 and cotton is produced in the dry 
northern agricultural lands of Cameroon,3 these two 
commodities were not used to select countries for 
field assessments. 
After initial inspection, CAR was excluded from 
the initial study due to its apparently low level of 
investment and procurement activity from China.4 
Equatorial Guinea was also excluded because oil 
represented more than 90% of its exports to China 
2 See e.g. ‘Where the oil is.’ http://mappery.com/map-of/
Sub-Saharan-Africa-Oil-Map (25 February 2011).
3 See e.g. Agricultural map of Cameroon, http://www.fao.
org/ag/AGP/agpc/doc/Counprof/cameroon/figure7.htm (25 
February 2011).
4 From available international data sources, compared to its 
CB neighbors, CAR apparently has fewer Chinese residents, 
less direct Chinese investment, and less trade with China. 
See e.g. http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20101026-chinois-afrique 
for a useful interactive map giving an overview of Chinese 
activities in Africa (25 February 2011).
and because, since implementing a logging ban in 
2007 (Mugnier and Martinez-Plaza 2010), its timber 
exports had fallen behind Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville 
and Cameroon. Of the four remaining countries, 
Gabon was selected because of its relatively high 
economic dependency on both China trade and 
investment as well as the forestry sector’s obvious 
importance and Chinese involvement therein. 
Cameroon and DRC were selected over Congo-
Brazzaville for the following reasons: 
1. DRC has the largest extent of both humid and 
dry dense forest in the region. 
2. DRC’s dependency on Chinese investment is 
higher than the Congo-Brazzaville. 
3. The high volume of ores and metals 
exported from DRC to China provides more 
opportunities in having a diversity of cases from 
different sectors. 
4. Cameroon’s timber exports to China have been 
increasing, compared to those from Congo-
Brazzaville, which have been declining. 
5. The presence of CIFOR’s regional office 
in Cameroon, and existing partnerships in 
Cameroon and DRC, would help to maximise 
project resources. 
2.2 Scoping methodology
Country-level scoping involved three main activities, 
including collection and review of documents and 
available statistics; key informant and stakeholder 
interviews; and, field visits to locations where specific 
Chinese projects of interest had been identified 
through the prior two activities. Documents 
included, for example, national legislation pertaining 
to investment in the three sectors of interest, news 
articles, government reports and project reports 
by various institutional actors. Statistics included 
internationally available trade and investment 
statistics and statistics provided by national 
government agencies. 
Among the stakeholders interviewed in-country 
were staff and officials of the relevant government 
ministries and agencies with oversight in the relevant 
2. Methodology
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sectors (e.g. investment, environment, forestry, 
mining, lands) and civil society members including 
NGO representatives and private sector personnel. 
In DRC, 72 interviews were conducted, including 
47 in Kinshasa and 25 in Katanga Province. In 
Cameroon, 30 interviews were conducted, while in 
Gabon, a total of 33 interviews were undertaken, 
with 21 in Libreville and the remainder in Ogooué-
Ivindo Province. The selection of sites for field visits 
was based on the research teams’ best judgment, 
based on the review of initial information obtained 
from the literature and from initial interviews at 
the national level, as well as practical considerations 
such as budgetary constraints in this initial phase of 
the project. The locations selected thus were mainly 
centred around mining in southern DRC, with short 
day visits to observe aspects of Chinese agribusiness 
near Kinshasa and the general logging situation 
in Mbandaka, Equateur Province. In Cameroon, 
where CIFOR has already done substantial work 
on Chinese logging, field scoping for this project 
covered Chinese agribusiness in the Central Region. 
In Gabon, our team visited villages in and around 
Chinese logging concessions in Ogooué-Ivindo 
Province (Table 3). 
During field visits, local perspectives were obtained 
through interviews with local officials, residents and 
employees of relevant companies. These different 
methods of enquiry were semi-structured around the 
following main research questions: 
•	 What are the main forest resources, agricultural 
commodities, and mineral exports to China? 
•	 What are the economic sectors (excluding the oil 
sector) which attract the majority of investments 
from the Chinese Government or private sector? 
•	 For a sample of three commodities purchased or 
invested in by Chinese Government/companies, 
what is the scope, scale and characteristics of 
current and planned Chinese and non-Chinese 
investments and/or sourcing practices for 
commodities of interest in forestry, agricultural 
and mining sectors? 
Table 1. Extent of forest cover and forest cover change 2005–2010, Congo Basin countries
Country
Dense forest covera Annual change
ha (millions) %b ha/yr (‘000s)
Cameroon -17 -1.07 -220
CAR 5 -0.13 -30
Congo 20 -0.05 -12
DRC 127 -0.20 -311
Equatorial Guinea 2 -0.71 -12
Gabon 21 0 0
Sources: FAO (2010), Eba’a Atyi et al. (2010)
a Including both humid and miombo ecotypes 
b Rate of gain or loss in percent of the remaining forest area each year within the given period
Table 2. Focus and locations of field scoping in Congo Basin countries
Country Sector
Forestry Mining Agriculture
Cameroon General situation surrounding 
logging in the southern part of the 
country, with a focus on Cameroon-
China timber exports trends
General situation of mining sector 
as derived from official documents 
and interviews
Chinese investment in production 
of rice, manioc and maize in Nanga 
Eboko (Central Region) 
DRC General situation surrounding 
logging in Mbandaka, Equateur 
Province, and timber processing/
trade in Kinshasa 
Chinese investment in copper and 
cobalt mining trade in and between 
Lubumbashi, Likasi and Kolwezi, 
Katanga Province
Chinese agribusiness in N’djili 
(Kinshasa) and the Bateke Plateau
Gabon Chinese investment in logging 
around three villages in Ogooué-
Ivindo Province
General situation of mining sector 
as derived from official documents 
and interviews
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•	 Who are the corporate actors involved? 
•	 To which locations are these investments 
channelled? From which locations are the 
commodities sourced?
•	 What corporate policies, national, legal and 
institutional frameworks, bilateral agreements and 
informal processes currently govern foreign direct 
investment and the corporate practices of Chinese 
and non-Chinese actors?
•	 How do key experts assess the nature of societal 
benefits (e.g. revenue generation, job creation, 
infrastructure) and costs (e.g. competition with 
domestic industries) of Chinese and non-Chinese 
investments in the commodities or sectors 
of interest? 
•	 What kind of local social, economic and 
environmental impacts may be observed from 
key informant interviews and field-based scoping 
of select Chinese investments/concessions in 
commodities of interest? Is there evidence of 
widespread deforestation?
•	 What projections may be made about likely 
deforestation from planned investments?
The scoping exercise yielded useful results, including 
an increased understanding of the main trends in 
natural resources trade between the target countries 
and China; the major land-based productive 
sectors targeted by Chinese investors; the role of 
national agencies in promoting investment and 
overseeing corporate adherence to environmental 
and social requirements; and, to some degree, a 
better understanding of the informal processes 
surrounding investment and acquisition of land 
and other resources. The research team has obtained 
information on the specific actors involved in the 
sectors and countries of interest, which will be useful 
in conducting subsequent specific case studies. The 
degree to which the study answers quantitative 
questions (e.g. extent of deforestation, actual jobs 
created, etc.) is limited and will require more targeted 
data collection in the project’s next phase. Future 
phases, in which specific cases will be selected for 
in-depth study, will permit a more comparative 
assessment of Chinese vs. non-Chinese trade and 
investment in selected locations than was possible 
during the broad rapid scoping stage.
3.1 China’s economic and political 
relations with Cameroon, Gabon 
and DRC
In this century’s first decade, especially after Beijing 
implemented its ‘going abroad’ policy (Luo et al. 
2010) with many new advantages for Chinese 
businesses operating internationally, flows of natural 
resources from Africa to China and of investment 
(and people) from China to Africa ballooned. An 
intense and ongoing international debate in many 
disciplines about the potential benefits vs. the social 
and environmental costs of China’s Africa policy was 
sparked by the combination of bullish trendlines 
published in business magazines, news of increasingly 
frequent official visits and subsequent aid and loan 
packages, the formation in 2006 of the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation, and occasional reports 
of illegal timber trading and human rights abuses 
associated with Chinese companies. 
However, although it was with ‘going abroad’ that 
China’s involvement in Africa began to explode, 
the history of Sino-African diplomatic relations, aid 
and investment in Africa as a whole and in our focal 
countries is not new. China’s official relations with 
Cameroon, Gabon and DRC go back to the early 
1970s, when China was courting a host of African 
countries to gain more global influence in a landscape 
dominated by competition between the West and 
the Soviet Union (Brautigam 2009, Shinn 2008) 
(Figure 2). With the establishment of diplomatic ties, 
3. Overviews
Figure 2. Chinese propaganda poster from 1975 depicting Chinese agricultural aid to Africa  
Chinese engagements in the Congo Basin and on the African continent in general proliferated in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Many early development assistance projects from China were agricultural projects, such as the one featured in this 
1975 propaganda poster, captioned ‘Revolutionary friendship is as deep as the ocean’. 
Source: Collection International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam. Designer: Guo Hongwu. Publisher: Shanghai Renmin 
Chubanshe, 1975. 
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Beijing immediately began offering aid and technical 
assistance. For example, in 1973, President Mobutu 
Sese Seko visited Beijing and returned with promises 
of US$100 million in agricultural aid (Young 1978). 
Over the next several decades, the nature of China’s 
aid ranged from the practical (such as agricultural 
investments as well as hospitals), to the symbolic (e.g. 
stadiums and monumental buildings) to the outright 
strategic, extending to the provision of arms to 
DRC and Cameroon and training for their military 
personnel in China (see, e.g. Shinn 2008). 
Current Chinese investments in the CB region dwarf 
all prior figures and are likely to greatly expand 
material trade flows. In DRC, there is the Sicomines 
deal, a USD6 billion investment in which USD3 
billion is earmarked for mining operations and 
USD3 billion for infrastructure development such 
as railways, roads, bridges and energy, including 
hydroelectric dam construction. In return, China 
receives mineral rights over a potential 7 million 
tonnes of copper (Tambwe K.’a Mwimba 2010). 
In Gabon, Chinese companies currently own 121 
concession permits to manage and log 2.67 million 
ha of forestland (Bilogo Bi Ndong and Banioguila 
2010) which is more than 10% of Gabon’s dense 
forest area. In DRC and Cameroon, Chinese 
agribusiness companies are negotiating for parcels of 
agricultural land ranging from 10 000 to 100 000 
ha for large food and palm oil production projects 
(TTRECED and CIFOR 2010, Brautigam 2009). 
Chinese financial engagements in Africa represent 
a hybrid of aid, concessionary and conditional 
loans and direct investment packages, often 
backed by loans from Chinese banks to Chinese 
State and private corporations, and with a focus 
on ‘win–win’ forms of engagement with high 
returns on investment (German and Schoneveld 
2011). In DRC, which highly depends on Chinese 
investment, money comes mostly in the form of 
concessionary loans targeting very specific and 
practical development sectors (Table 3). While 
China continues to give gifts, which may also be 
of a practical nature, they tend to be of a political 
nature in their timing (during State visits by Chinese 
officials to DRC or vice-versa) and in terms of their 
substance (projects requested by the president).5 
3.2 Sectoral overviews: forestry, 
mining, and agriculture in Gabon, 
Cameroon and DRC
The forestry sector
The timber industry is a major contributor to the 
economies of the Congo Basin (Table 4), especially 
those of Gabon and Cameroon, and to a lesser degree 
DRC. Sector development is particularly important 
in Gabon, where timber is the largest employment 
sector after the government, providing jobs to an 
estimated 14 000 people (just under 1% of the 
population), and where it is seen as a potential source 
of compensatory revenue to make up for declining 
oil resources (Chevalier et al. 2009). In Cameroon, 
the formal sector is estimated to employ some 13 000 
people (ca. 0.07% of the population), but indirect 
employment from the sector has been estimated at 
more than 160 000 jobs, or 0.8% of the population 
(MINEF 2006). 
5 CIFOR interview with a Kinshasa-based Chinese 
diplomat, 11 August 2010.
Table 3. Chinese bilateral aid and lending to the DR Congo from 2010 state budget
Sector Specific budget line Commitment
(US$)
% of total 
sector funding
Loan or gift
Transport Railroads  195 400 916 99% Loan
Infrastructure Road construction/rehabilitation  396 642 159 78% Loan
Agriculture 500 tractors  26 405 529 76% Loan
Energy Water sector  211 244 233 28% Loan
Energy Electricity sector  190 088 699 25% Loan
Defense Military assistance  2 313 124 7% Gift
Public health Hospital rehabilitation (all territories)  15 315 207 6% Loan
Source: DRC (2010)
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Forestry sector governance has seen major reforms 
in all three countries over the past decade. New 
legislative instruments introduced over the last two 
decades have centred around concession systems 
and requiring more elaborate forest management 
planning. In Gabon, the new law is designed not 
only to promote sustainable forest management 
and involvement of local communities, but also the 
sector’s industrialisation.6 The new law, eventually 
backed up by enforcement of a log export ban in 
2010, is expected to result in major changes in 
the segmentation of Gabon’s timber exports and 
development of the processing industry (Ndjimbi 
2010). In Cameroon, a log export ban has been in 
effect since 1999, although there is a yearly quota 
for log exports. In 2001, a decree was issued aimed 
at increasing the efficiency of per-area harvesting 
by requiring that management plans include a 
minimum of 20 species representing at least 75% 
of the standing volume inventoried in the forest 
management unit (Cerutti et al. 2011). In DRC, a 
new forest law in 2002 was followed by a series of 
activities aimed at correcting, institutionalising, and 
relaunching the forestry sector. 
Currently Gabon is in the process of developing 
more than 10 million ha of forest under its new 
legislation, which is intended to promote sustainable 
management. Under the new legislation, an 
investor must enter into a ‘provisional convention 
of management, exploitation, and transformation’ 
(CPAET), and provide a management within three 
years of signing (Gabon Forest Law, Article 23). 
This system has three types of logging permit: the 
sustainable management forest concession (CFAD), 
the forestry associates permit (PFA) reserved for 
Gabonese nationals, and the over-the-counter permit 
6 Gabon’s forest law, Loi 016/2001.
(PGG). As of mid-2010, Gabon had 7 million ha 
under CPAETs, 3.4 million ha under CFAD with 
approved management plans, and six concessions 
belonging to three companies under Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC) certification, totalling 
1.8 million ha. 
In DRC, reform of the sector has resulted in a 
process of title conversion in which many pre-
existing concession titles have been suspended. At 
the time of writing, there was a moratorium on 
allocating concessions and the sector was still in a 
process of reorganisation; this resulted in a crash 
in timber exports (see Table 4). By mid-2010, no 
companies holding concession titles had an approved 
management plan, and the concessions that had been 
allocated were concentrated in the hands of fewer 
actors; two-thirds of converted logging concessions 
had been awarded to just two corporate actors (du 
Preez and Sturman 2010). 
After an unsuccessful attempt to introduce FSC 
certification in Gabon in 1996, seven companies in 
Gabon, Cameroon and Congo-Brazzaville, holding 
concessions totaling around 3 million ha, rapidly 
obtained FSC certification between 2006 and 
2008. Another certification, Keurhout, previously 
certified around 1.2 million ha in Gabon but this 
is now being phased out and replaced by FSC. ISO 
14001 environmental management certification 
and certifications of legality or sustainable forest 
management are also used in Gabon, although to 
a lesser extent (Eba’a Atyi et al. 2010). In DRC, 
the issue of whether to extend FSC certification to 
logging companies has been greatly controversial, in 
part due to the sector’s incomplete reorganisation and 
the tendency of candidate companies to expand their 
operations prior to satisfaction of the new law’s basic 
Table 4. Contribution of forestry sector to tax earnings and GDP
Country Recorded wood exports, year 
(roundwood equivalent, m3)
Contribution to tax earnings 
(million EUR)
Contribution to GDP (%)
Cameroon 968 000 (2007) 62.1 6.00
Gabon 2 414 000 (2007) 31.3 4.30
Equatorial Guinea 579 000 (2007) 13.8 0.22
Congo-Brazzaville 999 000 (2007) 10.0 5.60
Democratic Republic of Congo 249 000 (2008) 1.7 1.00
1 077 000 (2007)
Source: Eba’a Atyi et al. ( 2010)
10 Putzel, L., Assembe-Mvondo, S., Bi Ndong, L.B. et al.
requirements (see for example, Greenpeace 2011). 
However, by the end of 2010, several companies 
were progressing towards certification and one had 
been awarded chain-of-custody and controlled wood 
certificates (FSC 2011). 
The new legal arrangements governing the allocation 
of forest concessions and the processing and trade 
of timber are based on principles of sustainable 
management, rent maximisation, and value-
adding to the countries’ resource base. In reality, 
implementation has encountered obstacles, often 
due to inconsistencies between national legislation 
and customary practices or subnational rules. For 
example, it has been found that in Gabon many 
high government officials have been beneficiaries 
of concession allocations, and have also failed to 
pay the requisite taxes under the new forest law. 
Another controversial practice in Gabon has been 
the subcontracting to foreigners of concessions in 
the coastal zone, technically reserved to Gabonese 
nationals, to the benefit of local officials (FSC 
2011). Recently in DRC, a provincial governor 
issued an edict blocking timber transport from the 
province by companies with legal concessions and 
national government approval, in an attempt to 
apply a set of conditions, including provincial-level 
payments, apparently in contradiction of the national 
forest law.7
The mining sector
After independence, most African countries 
nationalised mining, but over the past 20 years, and 
7 CIFOR interview with a director of a Kinshasa-based 
international conservation NGO, 30 July 2010.
especially in the 2000s, many countries liberalised 
the sector through new legislation aimed at attracting 
foreign investment, stimulating exploration and 
increasing export revenues (McMahon 2011). 
Mining is the mainstay of DRC’s export market, 
representing nearly 80% of national export revenues 
worth about US$2.8 billion (Table 5). Gabon 
is an important producer of manganese and has 
substantial iron reserves; the sector accounts for 
8–10% of export revenues ($550–600 million). In 
Cameroon, the sector is still nascent but expected to 
gain importance with the opening of bauxite reserves 
in the north as well as iron reserves near the Gabon 
border (Tieguhong et al. 2009). 
The DRC Mining Law of 2002 (Code minier) 
and the associated Mining Regulations of 2003 
(Reglément minier), as well as ministerial decrees, 
instituted major reforms in the mining sector’s 
governance, with the stated purpose of attracting 
investment. The reforms represent a liberalisation 
of access by new actors (whereas before the sector 
was dominated by a State-owned monopoly, the 
Général des carrières et des mines, or Gécamines) 
while, at the same time, modernising the institutions 
and guidelines for granting land and managing 
environmental and social impacts.8 The new law 
brought several new agencies under the Ministry 
of Mines, including an environmental department 
of mines, a cadastral department and an agency 
devoted to formalisation and control of small-scale 
and artisanal mining. These new agencies were 
created to manage the spatial allocation of mining 
8 DRC Mining Law: Loi No. 007/2002 du 11 juillet 2002 
portant Code minier. DRC Mining Regulations: Decret No. 
038/2003 du 26 mars 2003 portant Règlement minier.
Table 5. DR Congo mineral exports





Base metal ores and concentrates nes 853 762.00 23.90
Copper 609 758.00 17.10
Copper ores and concentrates 559 901.00 15.70
Misc non-ferrous base metals 467 023.00 13.10
Pearls, precious, semiprecious stone 332 412.00 9.30
2 822 856.00 79.10
Source: UNCTAD (2010)
nes = not elsewhere specified
Chinese trade and investment and  the forests of the Congo Basin   11
as well as its associated environmental impacts 
and the social problems associated with artisanal 
mining, which is at once a key livelihood activity for 
hundreds of thousands in several DRC provinces9 
and also a notorious arena for conflict and human 
rights violations (Global Witness 2010). Under the 
new rules, artisanal miners are required to belong to 
cooperatives and hold permits, and buyers must also 
be registered. 
Cameroon’s mining legislation also contains 
provisions governing small-scale and artisanal 
mining, which must be licensed, in part to protect 
the interests of the 10 000 or so independent diggers 
active in the country (Global Witness 2010). Both 
the DRC and Cameroon have had development 
projects to systematise artisanal mining; however in 
the DRC, there have also been (unsuccessful) efforts 
to stop the practice and demobilise miners (see for 
example, Global Witness 2011a). 
The agricultural sector
The industrial agricultural sector in Cameroon 
is comparatively well developed, with substantial 
exports of cacao, cotton, coffee and rubber. The 
sector is less well developed in Gabon, while in DRC 
the sector is in recovery after years of deterioration 
due to conflict, which destroyed key infrastructures. 
Cameroon has about 9.3 million ha of land suitable 
for agriculture, or 15% of the total land area, of 
which only 26% is cultivated (OECD 2006). The 
agricultural sector is an important contributor to the 
Cameroonian economy, comprising 14.7% of the 
country’s GDP in 2008 (ADB 2008). In addition, 
the sector employs nearly 70% of the workforce, and 
is a source of significant export revenues (Table 6). 
Cameroon’s principal agricultural exports include 
cocoa, cotton, coffee, bananas, and rubber. Although 
production of palm oil has been increasing over the 
past decade, Cameroon’s rank among producers 
hovers between 12 and 14 and remains one order 
of magnitude behind the volumes of Nigeria and 
Thailand and two orders of magnitude behind 
Indonesia and Malaysia (FAOSTAT 2011). 
9 Estimates of the numbers of artisanal miners in the DRC 
run to 700 000 individuals. See for example: Global Witness 
and Partnership Africa Canada 2004.
As part of its overall economic strategy, Cameroon 
is promoting private foreign investment in the 
agricultural sector, towards which the Government 
allocates substantial funds in various programs 
(MINADER 2006). Multilateral aid projects funded 
by the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) and Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO) largely target poverty reduction and food 
security, which is an area of concern: in February 
2008 there were demonstrations over rising food 
prices, causing concern about the State’s stability 
(Crisis Group 2010). 
The agricultural development strategy includes 
seeking investment projects such as construction of a 
chemical fertiliser factory; increasing competitiveness 
in producting maize, plantain, oil palm, rice, poultry, 
and pork; support for expanding cash crops such 
as cocoa and coffee; and mechanisation of rice and 
maize production.
Gabon is endowed with potentially arable land of 
almost 15.2 million ha, of which only 495 000 ha 
are currently exploited. In 2005, Gabon had a total 
population of 1.38 million, with only 15% living 
in rural areas (National Investment Report, Gabon 
2008). Agricultural sector development has been 
hampered by numerous structural factors including 
rural exodus, rural population ageing, and poor 
transportation infrastructure. Policies generally 
favour the development of large-scale agribusinesses 
such as rubber, oil palm, cocoa, coffee, beef and 
poultry. Gabon is not an agricultural country, despite 
the presence of fertile areas generally located in 
the valleys. 
Table 6. Cameroon agricultural exports






Cocoa 406 589 10.2
Cotton 160 696 4.0
Coffee and coffee 
substitutes 
111 715 2.8
Fruit nut (excl. oil), 
fresh or dried 
74 212 1.9
Natural rubber, 
latex, gum, etc 
74 037 1.9
Source: UNCTAD (2010)
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With support from FAO, the Government of Gabon 
formulated its Strategy for National Agricultural 
Development—Horizon 2015 which is organised 
around two main axes, namely increasing the capacity 
of rural household producers and development 
of private sector agribusiness, with a focus on 
supporting village operations and small to medium 
sized farms. Policies are oriented towards expanding 
and diversifying the production of cash crops 
(FAO 2011). 
DRC’s agricultural sector is in recovery and is the 
target of World Food Program ‘protracted relief and 
recovery operations’ aimed at reducing hunger, saving 
lives and protecting livelihoods during post-conflict 
transition. Programs include handover strategies 
to local institutions as well as local purchase of 
relief provisions for food distributions (Agrifeeds 
2011). Nonetheless, DRC is again starting to attract 
investor interest in cash crops such as oil palm and 
rubber, and has commissioned studies under its 
Multisectorial Emergency Program for Rehabilitation 
and Reconstruction (PMURR). However, with a 
transportation infrastructure still badly damaged 
by conflict and an extremely vulnerable rural 
population, the DRC has a long way to go (see for 
example, Agrer-Earth 2005). 
3.3 Investment promotion in 
Cameroon, DRC and Gabon
In order to promote private sector investment, 
the three countries have all instituted some form 
of legislation and an agency to implement it. 
Gabon’s Investment Charter was passed in 1998, 
followed by the institution of the private investment 
promotion agency APIP (Agence de promotion des 
investissements privés) in 2000. In DRC, a new 
Investment Law (Code des investissments) was passed 
in 2002 and the national investment promotion 
agency ANAPI (Agence nationale pour la promotion 
des investissments) was formed. Cameroon’s 
Investment Charter was passed in 2002 but its 
implementation was delayed, and it was not until 
2010 that the investment promotion agency ANPI 
was put in place (Fankam 2010). 
The purpose of these agencies is to promote 
investment by advertising the benefits offered 
by the State shepherding companies through the 
application process. The approach is referred to 
as a ‘guichet unique’ (single window). Companies 
entering through the investment agencies benefit 
from various exonerations on taxes and custom 
duties. Each country’s terms vary somewhat, but 
are similar in principle. For example, in DRC, as 
explained by an ANAPI official,10 according to the 
Investment Law, investors with approved projects are 
entitled to customs advantages, and fiscal advantages 
designed to encourage stabilisation and reinvestment. 
Customs advantages are structured such that, for 
importation of materials such as machines and 
excluding consumables, the investor pays 5% of cost, 
insurance and freight (CIF) value to the Director 
General of Customs. Similarly, on exported items, 
i.e. transformed products, they also pay 5% of ’free 
on board’ (FOB) value. In terms of fiscal advantages, 
whereas taxes on profits are 40%, for approved 
investors, taxes are 100% exonerated for 3–5 years 
depending on economic region. Land taxes (Impots 
Fonciers), which are calculated according to whether 
the land is developed or not, are similarly exonerated, 
as are taxes associated with capital improvements and 
taxes on company stocks. 
While the investment promotion agencies are 
designed to attract new investment, a good deal of 
incoming foreign investment passes them by. For 
example, in DRC, ANAPI explicitly does not cover 
the mining, banking or commercial sectors, which 
are covered under different legislation. In addition, 
most Chinese direct investment is agreed directly 
between the executive branch and the company or 
agency in China from which it comes.11 
In Gabon, investment promotion has jumped to 
a new level with the planned development of a 
Special Economic Zone (SEZ), which is jointly 
managed by the Gabon Government and Olam, a 
Singapore-based agribusiness and logging giant with 
400 000 ha of timber concessions in Gabon, now 
actively marketing the SEZ in Asia (see for example, 
Singapore Business Review 2010). Offering a suite 
of special terms to investors, the SEZ is especially 
targeting timber companies for investment in the 
processing industry; in-country processing, as 
previously mentioned, is now a requirement for 
foreign companies logging in Gabon and forms a 
strategy for value adding along with the log export 
10 CIFOR interview with a staff member of the DR Congo 
investment promotion agency (ANAPI), 30 July 2010.
11 CIFOR interview with a staff member of the DRC 
investment promotion agency (ANAPI), 30 July 2010.
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Table 7. Government promotion of the Gabon Special Economic Zone
Gabon SEZ, strategically located at Nkok, offers optimum logistic advantage by way of multiple connectivity to port Owendo 
30 km from the site, nearest rail connectivity from Ntoum and Owendo, nearest national highway RN 1 connecting just 500m 
away from northern boundary of the site.
Fiscal incentives
• Income tax holiday for 10 yrs and then concessional tax of 10% for next 5 yrs
• Complete waiver on import of material and export of manufactured product
• Duty exemptions on import of plant and machinery and spares
• Exemption of VAT (Value Added Tax)
Relaxations and waivers
• 50% concession on power tariff
• 100% repatriation of funds
• Relaxed labour laws
• Up to 5% DTA sales permitted without any tax implication
Common infrastructure
• Water treatment plant
• Sewage and effluent treatment plant
• Common log park
• Common dry kiln facility
• A 15 MW capacity ecofriendly co-gen power plant to generate power from the wood waste generated in the zone.
Forest concessions offered to the units 
The forest concession under sustainable management which can cover a surface area between
50 000 ha and 200 000 ha.
A single logging company can be granted many CFADs, however the cumulative area granted to one
company cannot exceed 600 000 ha.
Regulatory and statutory clearances
Gabon SEZ would facilitate to obtain all such necessary regulatory and statutory clearances required for setting up an industry in 
Gabon SEZ from various government departments of Gabon by way of single window clearance approach, simplifying the process 
in granting speedy approvals to the units.
Source: Government of Gabon and OLAM’s partnership website, ‘Advantage Gabon SEZ’. http://www.gabonadvance.com/HTML-
Website/advantage-gabon-sez.html (17 March 2011)
ban (Table 7). It will be important to understand 
several aspects of the benefits offered to companies 
under the SEZ incentives, including what is meant 
by ‘relaxed labour laws’. 
In terms of governance of environmental and social 
impact, the investment promotion agencies do not 
play a great role: these are decentralised by sector, 
with the relevant ministries governing mining and 
forestry managing their processes for approving 
management plans and environmental and social 
impact assessments. At most, the investment 
promotion agencies review the documentation of 
projects to see if they fulfill the requirements of the 
relevant ministries. In DRC, one more centralised 
agency is under the Ministry of Environment: 
the Environmental Study Group (Groupe d’études 
environnmentales du Congo, or GEEC) which was 
given a broad mandate but still is only likely receive 
projects funded by development banks requiring 
environmental and social impact assessments, 
generally road projects; the Ministry of Mines has its 
own environmental department.12 
3.4 Trends in Sino-African trade and 
investment in commodities by sector in 
Cameroon, DRC and Gabon
3.4.1 Trade 
In value and volume, Chinese imports from Congo 
Basin countries are largely composed of wood 
products and certain minerals such as copper and 
manganese. With the exception of cotton from 
Cameroon, which is excluded from this study because 
it is not produced in a region with important forest 
cover, China imports minimal agricultural projects 
from the Congo Basin, and we will not cover those in 
the trade overviews. There are some interesting pilot 
12 CIFOR interview with an agent of the Groupe d’études 
environmentales du Congo (GEEC),11 August 2010.
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projects in rice and maize, and some indications of 
new Chinese interest in palm oil production, which 
will be mentioned later. This section provides an 
overview of developments in the CB–China forest 
products and mineral trade. 
3.4.1.1 The China–Congo Basin forest 
products trade
For more than 10 years, Gabon has been the 
largest African supplier of logs to China, followed 
by Congo-Brazzaville and Equatorial Guinea, 
and Cameroon (Figure 2). Several CB countries 
historically have low processing rates and export 
substantial volumes of timber: notably, in 2007, 
national forestry ministries reported processing rates 
of 34% for Gabon compared to 75% for Cameroon 
(Eba’a Atyi et al. 2010). This difference is explained 
by the implementation of a 1994 law in Cameroon 
phasing out log exports over a 5-year period, except 
for a permitted quota. Gabon, on the other hand, 
continued to export high volumes of logs until 2010, 
when a log export ban was abruptly implemented, 
reportedly resulting in a sudden decline in exports 
(see for example, ITTO 2010). The effect of Gabon’s 
log export ban on China’s imports of Gabonese 
timber has yet to be examined. 
According to international trade figures, the DRC 
remains a relatively minor source of timber to 
China. In comparison to exports from Gabon and 
Cameroon, which peaked at US$400 million and 
$100 million respectively in 2008, DRC’s official 
exports to China remain at less than $20 million. 
However, DRC’s timber sales to China have been 
trending sharply upward since 2002 (Figure 3), and 
the volumes of timber illegally shipped through 
bordering countries have not been quantified, 
making the DRC timber sector a case worth 
closer investigation. 
3.4.1.2 The China–Congo Basin minerals trade
From 2000 to 2009, China’s imports of ores and 
minerals from Africa increased in value from 
around $350 million per year to more than $7 
billion. The most notable imports from Congo 
Basin countries were manganese from Gabon, 
and copper and cobalt from DRC and Congo-
Brazzaville. By 2007, exports to China of copper 
and cobalt from DRC were increasing substantially, 
while those from Congo-Brazzaville were on the 
decline (Figure 4). 
Figure 3. Timber exports to China from Gabon, Cameroon and DR Congo. While the volume from Gabon far 
surpasses the others, the increase from both Cameroon and DR Congo, as highlighted in the log scale representation 














































































































































































































































Figure 4. Main mineral exports from Congo Basin to China, 2000–2008. Note that copper from Congo-Brazzaville 
is being replaced by copper from DR Congo, and the increasing exports of processed copper compared to ore. 
Source: Zhang Hua (2010)
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3.4.2 Investment 
Overall FDI from China to the CB region increased 
steadily in the 2000s, reaching total stocks of US$25 
million in Cameroon and $100 million in Gabon 
in 2009. FDI into the DRC far surpassed other 
countries in the region, rising to nearly $400 million 
by 2009 in line with the growth of Chinese interests 
in Congolese minerals (Figure 5). 
A project report by the World Agroforestry Centre, 
‘Analysis of Chinese companies investing in the 
mining, agriculture and forestry sectors’, examines 
the trends and the major investment destination 
of Chinese companies based on the Ministry 
of Commerce (MOFCOM) China Companies 
Overseas Investment Database,13 which contains 
the approved list of Chinese companies planning to 
make overseas investments in land-based productive/
extractive industries from 1983 to 2010. The analysis 
focuses on the period 2002-2010, during which the 
number of investment applications grew dramatically 
at an annual average rate of 250%. Prior to 2002, 
MOFCOM recorded fewer than 10 applications 
per year, increasing to 388 in 2010. Although 
the records do not state the intended financial 
magnitude of investments nor indicate whether 
those investments were realised, in fact they are 
nonetheless a useful piece of supporting information 
because they correlate strongly with the trade data 
already presented. Between 2002 and 2010, targeting 
Africa as a whole, Chinese companies submitted 154 
applications related to planned mining investments, 
36 applications to invest in the forestry sector, and 37 
applications towards the agricultural sector. 
13 The database reflects companies applying to invest in 
Africa, but does not imply that all these companies eventually 
made actual investments either in Africa or in the sectors that 
they applied under. In addition to the direct investments in 
to Congo Basin countries approved by MOFCOM, Chinese 
companies are also involved in mergers and acquisitions of 
international corporations, many of which are involved in 
mining; these are not reflected in this analysis.
In the forestry sector, Gabon appeared most 
frequently, accounting for 25% (n=9) of the total 
planned investments throughout Africa. In the 
Congo Basin, the next most frequently appearing 
destination was Congo-Brazzaville, albeit with only 
three records, and Cameroon had one potential 
Chinese investor in forestry in 2010. Compared 
to applications to invest in other regions, the 
applications towards the CB were more geared 
towards timber extraction, as opposed to processing 
which was more prevalent in other regions. The 
largest destination for planned mining investments 
was DRC, with 24% of records (n=37), followed 
closely by Zambia (23%) and Tanzania (6%). Several 
companies also planned to invest in Gabon (n=4), 
Congo-Brazzaville (n=3) and Cameroon (n=2). Of 
the 37 planned investments targeting the agricultural 
sector, only five targeted the Congo Basin; three were 
bound for Cameroon and one for Gabon. However, 
of the planned investments in Cameroon, only 
one was agribusiness, while two were for poultry 
production. Zambia was by far the destination of 
greatest interest for Chinese agricultural investments. 
Based on the indicators shown in Table 3, which 
summarise the hypotheses that can be drawn from 
official data, in the following section we shall order 
the presentation of our results from investigating 
the detailed configurations of Chinese corporate 
activity in the target countries as follows: forestry 
(Gabon, Cameroon, DRC); mining (DRC, 
Gabon, Cameroon) and agriculture (Cameroon, 
Gabon, DRC).
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Chinese OFDI in DRC in million US$, 2003−2009
Chinese OFDI stocks
Chinese OFDI ows
Figure 5. Chinese overseas foreign direct investment in Cameroon, Gabon and DR Congo,  
2003–2009
Source: Engelhardt (2010)
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Table 8. Summary of main hypotheses drawn from sector overviews and trade and investment figures. These 








Economic contribution High Low
(due to sector reform, lack of 
transport infrastructure)
Very high
Exports to China Medium (and increasing) Low (and increasing) Very high
Planned direct investments 
from China





Economic contribution Underdeveloped Very high Medium
Exports to China Low (except aluminum only 
processed in Cameroon)
Very high Medium









Economic contribution High Low
(post-conflict, lack of 
infrastructure)
Low
Exports to China High
(cotton produced in non-
forest region)
Low Low
Planned direct investments 
from China
1 (rice) 1* 1 
4.  Activities of Chinese companies in 
the forestry sector14 
4.1 Gabon
By one popular account, the involvement of Chinese 
timber companies in Gabon dates back to the late 
1980s, when Gabon’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Jean Ping (now Chairperson of the Commission of 
the African Union), who is of Chinese and Gabonese 
descent, invited a relative from China to come to 
Gabon and develop the lumber industry (Michel 
and Beuret 2009). Since then, many entrepreneurs 
from China have arrived and found many lucrative 
opportunities to access Gabon’s rich timber resources. 
Now, Chinese-owned companies currently directly 
hold rights to around 25% of Gabon’s forests, more 
than half of which belong to just five companies 
(Bilogo Bi Ndong and Banioguila 2010). In addition, 
other companies are backed by Chinese capital, and 
together these companies ship more than 1 million 
m3 per year, or 70% of the country’s timber exports 
(Belligoli 2010). Chinese logging companies operate 
throughout Gabon (Figure 6), with a somewhat 
denser concentration of Chinese-owned forest 
concessions in the Ogooue Ivindo Province, which 
is particularly rich in timber. It is important to note, 
however, that Chinese investments in the timber 
sector are by private companies and individuals, 
rather than State-owned enterprises (SOEs), and are 
not known to be backed by Chinese development 
banks (Jansson et al. 2009).
As previously mentioned, Gabon’s forest law now 
requires investors to have a provisional convention 
of management, exploitation and transformation 
(CPAET) and defines three types of extraction 
permits: a permit for ‘concessions under sustainable 
management’ (CFAD), granted by the Ministry 
of Water and Forests; an over-the-counter permit 
(PGG); and a ‘forestry associates permit’ (PFA), a 
small-scale permit reserved for Gabonese nationals, 
which entails fewer administrative and forest 
management requirements. According the Brainforest 
scoping report conducted under the CIFOR project, 
Chinese companies use diverse ways to obtain 
14 The purpose of this report is not to identify companies 
active in the three countries, although a few companies 
are mentioned by name. For lists of companies, see Gabas 
et al. 2010.
logging rights, sometimes in ways that do not seem 
compatible with the spirit, if not the letter, of the 
forest law. However, the report also recognises 
that Chinese companies are not alone in failing to 
comply with the new law. Nonetheless, the particular 
strategies described are interesting. 
When, following the passage of the 2001 law, the 
per-area tax increased from 8 francs to 600 francs per 
hectare, driving many Gabonese PFA holders out of 
the market, many Chinese companies were able to 
acquire rights to harvest using PFA permits through 
legal loopholes allowing them to be transferred, 
rented, or even sold. In 2007, the Forestry 
Department’s cartographic division produced an 
analysis of these permits (DGEF 2007)., whereby the 
number of titles held by Chinese companies increased 
without their having to meet the more stringent 
management standards of the CFAD permit. 
 
While some Chinese companies have acquired 
rights to harvest many small-scale forests through 
multiple PFAs, others have opted to buy larger, 
established companies. Notable examples were the 
2009 purchase of the group Leroy Gabon (Plyrosol) 
by the Chinese company Honest Timber (DGEF 
2007) and, more recently, the purchase of Gabon 
Export Bois by the Shengyang group. In another 
case, a Chinese company is renting rights from two 
French companies, a practice not permitted under 
the new law, in anticipation of a planned acquisition 
of those companies.15 
In mid-2010, Gabon had issued 579 permits, of 
which 73 were under review and inactive; of these, 
121 permits for a total of 2.67 million ha (25% 
of the forest area) were held by Chinese-owned 
companies (Bilogo Bi Ndong and Banioguila 2010). 
In addition to the large companies registered by the 
national Trade Registry, around 10 more Chinese-
owned companies have registered with the private 
investment promotion agency, APIP, since 2008. In 
comparing lists of companies between APIP and the 
15 Brainforest interview with a representative of a Chinese 
timber company.
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Ministry of Water and Forests, Brainforest found 
that companies registered with the former are not 
recorded by the latter, which suggests that APIP 
registration could be used as a strategy by companies 
to legitimise their status without joining systems that 
incorporate sustainable forestry instruments. 
In addition to the potentially questionable ways 
in which some Chinese operators have obtained 
logging rights, the Brainforest report notes more 
straightforward violations, including failure to pay 
area taxes, illegal logging of national parks adjacent 
to concessions, logging of trees below the legal 
minimum diameter, improper documentation of 
timber, absence of the required hammer mark used to 
verify the legality of felled trees, and incorrect listing 
of volumes on waybills.16 
Chinese enterprises and social sustainability
Throughout the Congo Basin, part of the process 
of obtaining a concession and extraction permits 
16 To substantiate many of these allegations, Brainforest 
relies on a particular report by a researcher Obame Ondo, 
who also suggests that Chinese operators are intentionally 
delaying preparation of management plans while hurrying 
to extract as much timber as possible before the defaulting 
on their CPAETs. The full citation is Obame Ondo, A. P. 
pour l’UICN 2010, ‘Etude sur le poids et les impactes de 
l’activité des enterprises à capitaux chinois dans la filière 
bois gabonaise’.
Figure 6. June 2010 map showing the area and distribution of timber concessions belonging to 
Chinese companies (outlined in yellow)
Source: Projet des petits permis forestiers gabonais (PAPPFG), in Bilogo Bi Ndong and Banioguila (2010)
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Table 10. Annual timber production, Cameroon total 
and Hong Kong group 
2006 2007 2008 2009
Cameroon 
total (m3)










8.1 4.3 7.3 3.8
Source : TTRECED and CIFOR (2010)
in Douala, are very active in the small-scale, 
informal sector.
With almost 570 000 ha of forest concessions—
approximately 10% of the total area of concessions 
granted in Cameroon—the Hong Kong group ranks 
first among the timber companies in the country. It 
is immediately followed by groups whose majority 
shareholders are from EU countries including France, 
Italy, and the Netherlands (Table 9). 
All the FMUs and main primary processing factories 
of the Hong Kong group are located in the Eastern 
Region, the largest forest region of Cameroon. 
Seven of the nine FMUs are located in the extreme 
southeast, and of these, two are adjacent to protected 
areas, namely the Nki Boumba Bek National Park 
and the Lobéké National Park. 
Despite its large holdings, the Hong Kong group’s 
annual production has been irregular over the past 
several years (Table 10). 
In general, the practices of ethnic Chinese investors 
in the forestry sector have been found to be not 
discernibly different from their competitors, although 
is to inform local stakeholders and negotiate a 
corporate social responsibility agreement (Cahier 
des charges, CdC) to promote the rights of workers 
and local communities and ensure some level of 
benefit sharing. Gabon’s forest law (Law 016/2001, 
Article 251) requires, as part of the CdC, a financial 
contribution from concession owners to support 
community development activities. However, in 
Gabon the CdC is integrated in the management 
plan; if the latter is not in effect the CdC is not 
necessarily implemented, which seems to be the case 
with a number of Chinese companies. 
On the other hand, in the village of Ikobey, 
one of the subnational scoping sites visited by 
Brainforest, residents recognise one major Chinese 
company which makes efforts to conform to 
social responsibility standards by regularly making 
its financial contributions to the communities 
surrounding its concessions. However, an interesting 
observation by one resident was the tendency of 
Chinese company staff to ‘do everything themselves’, 
including hunting, fishing and gardening, thereby 
‘impeding the economic development of the village’. 
In terms of access to forest resources, according 
to Brainforest interviews with villagers in Mékob, 
Ikobey and Mayiboth, located within and near a 
Chinese concession, the company allows free access 
to the forest for subsistence activities. On the other 
hand, the company does not have a management 
plan, whereby it would be required by law to set aside 
areas for community usufruct rights. 
4.2 Cameroon
Over the past decade, China has become a major 
market for Cameroonian timber, especially since 
2006 when the value of exports jumped from 
US$50 million to $100 million (Figure 3). Only one 
Chinese logging company is active on the ground: 
a Hong Kong–headquartered private company 
operating through numerous subsidiaries. In 1997, 
this company acquired a French company and its 
subsidiaries that had been active in Cameroon for 
more than 20 years. Through these subsidiaries, 
the Hong Kong company operates nine Forest 
Management Units (FMUs) in six forest concessions, 
as well as a number of sawmills. Besides the Hong 
Kong group, several small, ethnic Chinese-owned 
furniture companies and exporters, mainly located 
Table 9. Ranking of concession holdings by national 
origin of concession holders




1 Hong Kong 570 000
2 France 555 103
3 Italy 411 872
4 Netherlands 383 407
5 Cameroon 238 192
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Company A is the same company that lost its 
concession title in the conversion process. Although 
the company has a presence online and a telephone 
number in Beijing, it is difficult to locate its office in 
Kinshasa. An attempt to find the address listed with 
the Department of Forestry was unsuccessful. 
Company A is apparently the sole subsidiary of a 
holding company based in Hong Kong and both 
companies are controlled by the same individual. 
These companies are in turn part of a group with 
a Beijing address, which advertises itself as having 
access to forests, rare minerals and scarce resources 
such as oil and gas in DRC.
According to the Beijing group’s website: 
[Company A] is a company engaged in industrial, 
forestry, harvesting, processing and sales and 
related equipment import and export, and 
incorporated in July 2001 in Kinshasa, DRC. 
In DRC, Company A has a 25-year logging 
concession of 188 672 hectares, which is valid 
until February 2032 and renewable without 
conditions for an additional 25 years. This 
concession is located in Ingende District, Equateur 
Province, and contains a standing timber volume 
of 5000 million m3, of which 760 million m3 are 
valuable species, and has the capacity to produce 
20 million m3 of timber per year.19 
Despite Company A losing its concessionary rights 
before January 2009, the Hong Kong holding 
company managed a listing on the Euronext Stock 
Exchange in November 2009, with a disclosed equity 
capital of HKD 5 million, an opening share price 
of EUR 0.30 for an initial offering of 25 million 
out of a total 250 million shares.20 Since then, the 
company’s stock has lost much of its value. 
Company B is a small, little-known company, which 
has recently moved from the address listed with 
the DGF. While it was possible to track down the 
Kinshasa address of Company B’s office, access was 
not granted. It is partly because many small Chinese-
owned companies maintain such a low profile that 
one timber company manager said they appear to be 
‘pirate’ companies, whether or not they are engaged 
in illegal business.21 
19 Author’s translation.
20 This information is available on the website of the 
Euronext exchange, accessed 23 February 2011.
21 CIFOR interview with a Kinshasa timber company 
manager, 17 August 2010.
strong demand from the Chinese market does change 
company practices regardless of their national origin 
(Cerutti et al. 2011). This finding is explained by 
the fact that the logging industry in Cameroon is 
controlled by a legal regime that does not permit 
free riding by a particular company. The Hong 
Kong group is no exception. While illegal practices 
may often be attributed to this group, in fact these 
practices can be seen to arise from factors related 
to the general national context, through which 




With the reallocation of concession titles in 2008, 
no Chinese-owned company received a concession, 
and therefore all Chinese companies in DRC are 
operating outside the formal industrial sector. Prior 
to the reconversion process, one Chinese-owned 
company held a concession, albeit granted during 
the moratorium. The concession was not renewed 
because several conditions were not met, including 
failure to legally register as a logging company or 
timber processing company, failure to pay land area 
taxes, lack of a business plan, and lack of milling 
facilities. According to an official from the DGF, 
before reconversion of titles, two to three Chinese 
companies came to negotiate for concessions, but 
none were entertained.17 
Now, during the moratorium, two Chinese-owned 
companies are cutting with artisanal permits granted 
by the Ministry of Environment’s Department of 
Forestry (DGF):18 
Company A
Area and volume permitted: 50 ha, 350m3
Equateur, Bikoro territoire, Lieu Foret Kalamba, 
Secteur Elanga
Company B
Area and volume permitted: 50 ha, 350m3
Species: Wenge (Millettia laurentii)
Location: Equateur, Territoire Lukolela, Lieu Boleli, 
Secteur Mpoka
17 CIFOR interviews with an official of the DRC 
Fédération des industries de bois, 6 August 2010 and with an 
official of the Direction générale des forêts, DRC Ministry of 
Agriculture, 17 August 2010.
18 CIFOR interview with an official of the Direction 
générale des forêts, DRC Ministry of Agriculture, 
17 August 2010.
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For the most part, timber is exported to China by 
formal DRC timber companies, including those 
owned by European companies, and small ethnic 
Chinese exporters. One such company is one of the 
few Chinese-owned companies to invest formally 
through ANAPI, and reportedly intended to spend 
US$280 000 to build a sawmill in 2009. That 
company, according to its web publicity, specialises 
in sales of wenge, a high value hardwood popular for 
flooring in China, and afrormosia (Pericopsis elata).22 
Such companies buy locally from timber companies 
22 The company website was accessed by the main author on 
23 February 2011.
and from the Kinshasa river port. There they receive 
prepaid orders of up to 500 m3, mostly of specialty 
woods such as wenge, sapelli (Entandrophragma 
cylindricum) and sipo (Entandrophragma spp.); the 
highest current demand is for wenge.23 It seems 
Chinese buyers have difficulty dealing with large, 
industrial companies. According to one company, 
Chinese buyers approach them but they never 
manage to close a deal.24 This is explained by the 
supplier as a lack of the desired species, but it may 
also be due to pricing problems.
23 CIFOR interview with an official of the DRC Fédération 
des industries de bois, 6 August 2010.
24 CIFOR interview with a Kinshasa timber company 
manager, 17 August 2010.
5.1 DRC
The DRC mining sector is of interest to forestry in 
part because of the high degree of overlap between 
mining concessions and forested areas, including 
national parks, and because little systematic study has 
been undertaken of the effects of the national mining 
industry on forest cover and quality (Figure 7). 
At least three main types of mining are in DRC: 
large-scale industrial mining, which entails major 
infrastructure investments and requires a large 
permanent work force; small-scale and medium-scale 
mining, which can be carried out without major 
initial investments and relies more on casual labour; 
and artisanal mining, in which individuals and 
families, often migrating long distances and settling 
in camps, work alone, in cooperatives, or on behalf 
of companies. 
The interest of Chinese companies as well as the 
central government in DRC’s mineral resources 
are obvious, and the modalities of obtaining those 
resources mirror the diversity of business models 
prevalent in the region, from large-scale investment 
in industry such as that embodied in the Sino-
Congolese Convention of 2008, to small-scale private 
investments in small-scale mining joint ventures, 
to independent comptoirs in mineral-rich areas in 
several provinces.25 As actors of other nationalities 
25 CIFOR interviews with a director of the DRC 
investment promotion agency (ANAPI), 2 August 2010 and 
with an agent from an artisanal mining cooperative, Kolwezi, 
30 November 2010.
5. Chinese activities in the mining sector
Figure 7. Proportion of forest cover in mining concessions
Source: Translated from Bélanger and Mertens (2011)
Projection: Mercator DRC
Scale: 1:12 000 000
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come under scrutiny, such as applied by Global 
Witness to the UK Government and UK companies, 
and the controversy surrounding Anvil Mining, a 
Canadian company that engaged military assistance 
to suppress a popular uprising resulting in 70 deaths 
(CBC 2010), Chinese companies are there to take 
over and modify supply chains. Thus, where coltan 
and cassiterite from the Kivus was once shipped 
through Rwanda by UK and US companies (among 
others), now Chinese companies are beginning to 
source these rare minerals from Katanga, where they 
may now be being extracted by displaced artisanal 
diggers from the Kivus.26
Chinese industrial-scale mining: the 
Sicomines deal
Increasingly, major mining investments in DRC 
are governed by ‘conventions’ rather than contracts, 
which seems to highlight their national importance 
and complexity. Such is the case with the American 
mining company Tenke Fungurume Mining (TFM) 
investment, as well as the new Sicomines investment, 
which is sketched out in the Sino-Congolese 
Convention (SCC) of 2008. Originally, the SCC was 
drafted as a US$9 billion investment, with $3 billion 
for mining infrastructure and $6 billion for national 
infrastructure such as energy and transportation. 
However, after the International Monetary Fund 
raised concerns about the impact of the new loans 
on DRC’s external debt, the value of the deal was 
revised to $6 billion. The deal includes mining rights 
for Sicomines in the Gécamines-owned Dikulwe-
Mashamba (DIMA) concession near Kolwezi, one 
of the world’s largest confirmed copper reserves, 
for which $850 million of the package was used to 
purchase rights belonging to a company owned by 
the Belgian tycoon Georges Forrest.27
Reportedly, the DIMA concession contains 10 
million tonnes of copper and cobalt, which 
presumbly will be shared according to allocated 
shares in 68:32 ratio between China and DRC. 
However, in reality, the terms of the deal are 
not known, except for the very general terms 
unofficially leaked in various documents (Global 
26 CIFOR Interview with an agent from an artisanal mining 
cooperative, Kolwezi, 30 November 2010.
27 CIFOR interview with a researcher from the Kinshasa 
Centre d’études pour l’action sociale (CEPAS), 2 August 
2010 and with two Lubumbashi-based experts on mining 
and human rights, 28 November 2010.
Witness 2011b). What is certain is that, with China 
entering large-scale mining in DRC, a domain 
previously dominated by European, Canadian and 
US multinational companies, the details around 
implementation of the Sino-Congolese deal will be 
closely scrutinised. 
Regarding Sicomines’ social and environmental 
responsibility, the DIMA concession is located largely 
within longstanding Gécamines pits, and therefore 
most of the associated deforestation occurred long 
ago (Figure 8), and little incremental impact on 
forests is therefore likely. However, according to one 
informant, new quarries are to be developed,28 and 
Sicomines has already begun prospecting activities.29 
Whether or not Sicomines will be opening new 
areas to mining, the law requires the preparation 
and approval of an environment mitigation and 
rehabilitation plan, an environmental impact 
assessment, a project environmental management 
plan including assessments, and plans for the 
‘sociological’ environment. It is not clear whether 
the Sicomines deal was preceded by any assessments 
or plans, and it is unclear who should be responsible 
for environmental due diligence given the joint 
venture’s ownership structure and the fact that 
the DIMA concession is a Gécamines holding.30 
While environmental impacts may mostly have 
already occurred, around 12 000 local people are 
permanently living in DIMA,31 and there are many 
artisanal extractors; therefore, the management 
of the social impacts of Sicomines should not 
be overlooked.
Even in this preliminary prospecting phase, 
according to a local cooperative, Sicomines has 
destroyed people’s fields and disturbed local schools, 
resulting in complaints. However, it is possible 
that corruption occurred causing local authorities 
to ignore these complaints.32 According to a local 
resident and former Gécamines employee, around 
28 CIFOR interview with a Kinshasa-based Chinese 
diplomat (2), 11 August 2010.
29 CIFOR interview with an agent from an artisanal mining 
cooperative, Kolwezi (2), 30 November 2010.
30 CIFOR interview with an official from the Ministry of 
Mines Environmental Department, Kolwezi, 30 November 
2010.
31 CIFOR interview with local resident, village near DIMA 
concession, 1 December 2010.
32 CIFOR interview with an agent from an artisanal mining 
cooperative, Kolwezi, 30 November 2010.
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200 local residents were at one point displaced and 
given plastic sheeting, but no compensation.33 Also, 
according to local informants, the Sicomines deal 
has already caused delocalisation of artisanal miners, 
which is executed by the Service des mines.34 When 
this occurs, diggers receive no compensation, since 
their presence is illegal, although they may have been 
allowed to remain for some time ‘for social reasons’. 
In all, several thousands of people will be affected by 
delocalisation and loss of access to the resource.35 
After the 3-year prospecting phase, during which 
some open pits that have filled with water will be 
drained, Sicomines will become operational in 2014. 
33 CIFOR interview with local resident, village near DIMA 
concession, 1 December 2010.
34 CIFOR interview with an official from the Ministry of 
Mines small scale mining oversight agency, SAESSCAM, 
Kolwezi, 30 November 2010.
35 CIFOR interview with an agent from an artisanal mining 
cooperative, Kolwezi (1), 30 November 2010.
Sicomines is expected to employ 10 000 workers, 
but a high percentage is expected to be Chinese. 
Currently, in this prospecting phase, there are 
ca.20–30 Chinese employees working in the DIMA 
concession, as well as Congolese casual laborers, who 
earn FC 8000 (US$8.85) per day.36
Chinese small-scale mining and engagement 
with the artisanal sector
After the liberalisation of the mining sector, the 
number of small Chinese comptoirs and several 
extractive companies increased greatly in 2004–2005. 
By 2007, Chinese mining small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) in Katanga Province numbered 
around 60, and were mostly located in and between 
36 CIFOR interviews with a Lubumbashi expert on 
mining and human rights, 28 November 2010, an agent 
from an artisanal mining cooperative, Kolwezi (2), 30 
November 2010, and a group of artisanal miners near DIMA 
concession, 1 December 2010.
Figure 8. 2009 satellite image of Sicomines’ Dikulwe-Mashamba concession area. Prominent in the lower centre 
of this image is a workers’ town built by Gécamines, where about 12 000 people live permanently.
Source: Google Earth (2011)
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Lubumbashi, Kolwezi, and Likasi in the Katanga 
copper belt. Most of these companies are small 
joint ventures with DRC partners, but the Chinese 
counterpart is sometimes a large multinational with 
financial backing from Chinese banks.37 
In 2009 Rights and Accountability in Development 
(RAID) issued a report on working conditions in 
Chinese companies in Katanga, a topic of continuing 
investigation by local rights experts. Overall, the 
RAID report found that in the view of Congolese 
workers, Chinese companies ranked lowest, along 
with DRC companies, in terms of general workplace 
conditions. European and US companies rated 
highest, but companies from Canada, South Africa 
and Australia were not rated highly. It appears 
that Chinese companies may have a lower sense of 
social and environmental responsibility, and tend 
to operate without a CdC, and they can be difficult 
to follow, because of shifting locations and lack of 
permanent offices.38 
In terms of salary, where large Western companies 
paid US$300 per month, the RAID reports that 
Chinese SMEs paid $150–$220 per month for 
full-time labourers. These ranges correspond with 
our observations in November–December 2010. At 
a small Chinese join venture mine near Kisamfu, 
Katanga, labourers reportedly earn $200–$250 per 
month, but with no days off and no contract.39 This 
is slightly lower than a neighbouring Israeli-owned 
mine, where employees earn a monthly $250–$300. 
Chinese skilled employees, by comparison, earn 
CNY7000–8000 (about $1200). At Sicomines 
concession, casual workers earn about $220 
per month.40 
The RAID report also documents instances of severe 
ill-treatment of employees by Chinese managers, 
and such accounts continue to be mentioned by 
local human rights experts, though some are the 
same events already mentioned in the 2009 report. 
37 CIFOR interviews with several informants, supported 
by RAID (2009) Chinese mining operations in Katanga, 
Democratic Republic of Congo. Rights and Accountability in 
Development. Available at: www.raid-uk.org.
38 CIFOR interview with an official from the Ministry of 
Mines small scale mining oversight agency, SAESSCAM, 
Kolwezi, 30 November 2010.
39 CIFOR interview with a Chinese and Congolese 
employee of a Chinese mining company near Kawama, 
Kolwezi, 2 December 2010.
40 CIFOR interview with a group of artisanal miners near 
DIMA concession, 1 December 2010.
Figure 9. Chinese joint-venture small cobalt mining 
site near Kasamfu, Katanga Province, DR Congo 
Source: Google Earth
A. Material from the mine is washed on site, using water from 
a stream that crosses the site. Although there are holding 
ponds, the runoff is not properly contained, which is potentially 
causing contamination of the stream. 
B. Although the mine is located in a heavily wooded area, little 
damage to the forest is visible in the vicinity of the mine itself. 
C. The company uses labour from a local camp of transient 
miners 3 km from the mine, which is similar to the camp of 
artisanal miners in nearby Kawama, and presumably entails 
similar levels of per-capita forest degradation. 
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The report suggests that such abuses may not be 
typical, but are probably also underreported, since 
official pursuit of cases against ordinary workers 
is unlikely. Cases mentioned in 2010 included a 
case in which artisanal miners working in open pits 
were accidentally buried by a Chinese company’s 
machines, sparking protests resulting in the shooting 
of 10 people. While there are no known cases of 
Chinese bosses shooting workers themselves, there 
are reported cases of grave abuses, some of which 
have led to court cases, including a manager stabbing 
a worker in the temple with a screwdriver, a manager 
whipping four employees, a manager urinating on 
a worker, and dismissal of injured workers without 
sufficient medical attention or compensation.41 
In terms of forest impacts, Chinese comptoirs that 
only buy and sell ores are not directly linked to 
deforestation; however, they may be linked to some 
deforestation and more significant degradation 
through their business dealings with the artisanal 
mining sector. On the other hand, companies that 
process copper may be linked to deforestation if 
they use wood charcoal in their processing. Small 
companies such as the Chinese mine we visited near 
Kasamfu, between Kolwezi and Likasi in Katanga 
Province, are responsible for significant albeit 
probably very localised environmental damages 
(Figure 9). While these damages may not include 
direct and obvious deforestation, they are likely to 
include contamination of local water sources. Where 
casual labour is employed, worker’s camps result in 
forest degradation.42 In the case of the Chinese mine 
near Kasamfu, the responsibility is shared between 
the Chinese and DRC owners, as well as with a 
larger Israeli industrial mining company that holds 
a nearby concession and employs workers from the 
same camp. 
5.2 Gabon
As of 2010, only two Chinese planned mining 
investment projects were in Gabon, both still 
in a negotiation or preparation phase, namely 
the Comibel iron mining deal and the Huazhou 
manganese mining deal.
41 CIFOR interview with a Lubumbashi expert on mining 
and human rights, 28 November 2010.
42 Personal observation and comparison of high-resolution 
satellite images, described in Putzel and Kabuyaya’s detailed 
scoping report conducted for this project.
The Comibel deal (Belinga deposit)
In 2006, a large iron mining concession located 
in the Belinga mountains in northeast Gabon was 
awarded to the Chinese joint-venture Comibel 
(Compagnie minière Bélinga) over a Brazilian bidder. 
The concession is for 25 years and when the mine is 
in operation, it is expected that production will reach 
30 000 tons annually. According to the Gabonese 
Government, the decision to choose Comibel was 
motivated by two factors: 1) Chinese financing was 
seen to be more stable, as it was coming from a State 
bank; and 2) the Comibel package included more 
infrastructure development, including a shipping 
port, a railway and a hydroelectric dam.
Apart from these official reasons, many rumours 
circulated. One allegation was that bribes of several 
million CFA francs were delivered every week to 
senior government officials. It was also alleged that 
former French president Jacques Chirac spoke in 
favour of the Chinese to prevent the Brazilians from 
taking the market in Gabon (Jansson et al. 2009). 
Initially the project, including the infrastructure 
investments, was worth US$3 billion in the form of 
conditional loans from China Eximbank. However, 
after Comibel finished preliminary technical studies 
in 2009, the price tag for the mine and infrastructure 
development had ballooned to $5.9 billion. This was 
considered excessive by President Bongo, who in May 
2010 made a new proposal during a visit to China43 
and negotiations started anew (Jansson et al. 2009). 
Environmentally, the Gabonese Government’s 
decision to install the hydroelectric dam at Kongou 
Falls has been criticised by national and international 
civil society groups; a 2008 study found that the 
dam would likely have negative environmental 
impacts as well as causing displacement of some 
villages and damage to sources of subsistence such 
as fishing and hunting areas (Lebas 2010). As the 
deal is renegotiated, the inclusion of a dam and its 
eventual location are of interest, though it would be 
important to clarify whether populations vulnerable 
to displacement or other impacts are indeed located 
in the immediate vicinity of these falls 
43 CIFOR interviews with an official of Gabon’s Ministry of 
Mining in Libreville 31 May 2010 and with a Chinese agent 
7 June 2010.
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The Huazhou manganese mining deal 
(CICMH)
The Sino-Gabonese joint venture CICMH 
(Compagnie Industrielle et Commerciale des Mines 
Huazhou), whose majority shareholder is the Chinese 
state company CITIC (China International Trust 
and Investment Corporation), has been awarded a 
manganese concession in Ndjolé which is expected 
to produce 1 million tonnes of manganese annually. 
CICMH is also currently building a plant in Ndjolé 
where 50% of the extracted ores will be processed. 
The remainder will be processed in factories 
in China. 
This project has been about to start since 2008. In 
accordance with relevant regulations, the CICMH 
commissioned an environmental impact study 
by a consultancy firm located in Libreville. The 
findings of this study are available at the Directorate 
General for Environment. On 21 October 2010, 
the Government of Gabon and the Compagnie 
Industrielle et Commerciale des Mines Huazhou 
proceeded to sign the convention to initiate 
operation of the mine, but the exact date of 
operations was not announced (L’union 2010).
5.3 Cameroon
In Cameroon, despite a high mineral potential 
and great geological diversity, the mining sector is 
underdeveloped. While the national media reports 
that the mining sector has been growing for a 
decade, this dynamic has yet to significantly impact 
the overall economy of the country: excluding oil, 
the contribution of mining to GDP is only 0.13% 
(Cameroon Tribune 2010a). Despite the existence 
of a mining code and favourable legislation, the 
sector faces numerous constraints, including 
conflict between the mining and forestry sectors, 
insufficient financing and technical capacity 
(MINIMIDT 2008). 
Figure 10. Overlaps between mining exploration permits and forestry concessions and national parks in the 
area of South East Cameroon. Eight out of 10 mining exploration permits overlap with forest. 
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Since 2003, the number of permits has grown from 
only one to 91; however, 87 are for exploration only 
and only four are for exploitation, and overall 40% 
of permits are inactive (Cameroon Tribune 2010b). 
Industrial mining is mostly carried out by around 20 
Cameroonian and foreign companies with complex 
financial arrangements. Among these, major investors 
are an Australian investor in iron mining, Korean 
gold and diamond miners, British gold miners and 
US uranium miners. Artisanal mining is mostly 
focused on mining precious stones and gold, unlike 
in DRC where artisanal miners dig for raw ores 
which are then consolidated in large quantities.
Chinese exploration in the South Region
The forested South Region of Cameroon is of 
particular interest to this study, in part because of 
the many overlaps between mining concessions and 
forestry concessions or national parks (Figure 10), 
and also because of the presence of two Chinese 
companies with exploration permits for iron and 
gold, respectively. In this region, the majority of 
foreign investments and financial packages are joint 
ventures. During the period 2006–2009 and on 
the basis of an analysis of 31 exploration permits 
targeting the southern Cameroon forest, the total cost 
of investments in mineral exploration for 10 products 
amounted to 25 billion CFA francs (US$50.6 
million), of which half is directed towards iron ore 
mining, and of which half the capital is Australian. 
The Chinese investment comes in much lower at an 
estimated 0.9 billion CFA francs ($1.845 million). 
The influence of Chinese investment cannot yet be 
determined in this exploratory phase which should 
lead to the certification of reserves, impact and 
feasibility assessments and negotiation of mining 
agreement within in the next two years. According to 
an official from the Ministry of Mines, as measures 
to prevent damage to the forest, holes caused 
by cores extracted are required to be filled with 
concrete, and the area allocated for exploration was 
initially reduced.44
44 TTRECED interview with a team from MINIMIDT 
September 2010.
To date, Chinese investments in agriculture in the 
three countries have been limited to demonstration 
projects funded as part of China’s development 
assistance, relatively minor private agribusiness 
investments, generally of a pilot nature, and small 
farms belonging to individual Chinese expatriates. 
All three countries import significant volumes of 
food, and hunger is a continuous problem in DRC, 
while Cameroon is vulnerable to food price shocks; 
these resulted in civil unrest in 2008 (Crisis Group 
2010). Thus, development is a priority, a fact that 
Chinese policy makers have long been aware of. 
Food security has been a key feature of Chinese 
development assistance since the 1970s. Now, 
companies interested in agribusiness development 
have started to enter the region. 
6.1 Cameroon
In 2006 the Government of Cameroon signed 
an MoU with a Chinese multinational which got 
its start farming Namibian ostriches in Shaanxi 
Province, China, for development of a concession of 
10 000 ha of land for development and production 
of rice, cassava and maize crops in Haute Sanaga, 
Cameroon. A second MoU was signed 10 January 
2008 in Yaoundé between the authorities of both 
countries. That agreement covers the construction 
of a pilot project in the town of Nanga Eboko 
(Jansson 2009) (Figure 11). The following account 
is based on a field visit to the area by TTRECED 
and CIFOR.
Sino-Cameroonian Nanga Eboko project
The MoU signed in 2006 between the State of 
Cameroon and the Chinese businessman Wang 
Jianjun, majority owner of a Chinese group, 
promises a concession of 10 000 ha near Nanga 
Eboko. The implementation of this MoU began 
in 2008 in Bifogo, a village located 4 km from the 
town of Nanga Eboko on a preliminary 120 ha site, 
where the company has tested rice varieties on what 
was once a Taiwanese farm, shut down in 1971 with 
the normalisation of Sino-Cameroonian relations. 
The current yield is estimated at 10 tonnes/ha. 
The current phase of implementation created jobs 
for about 60 Chinese and 100 nationals. Part of 
that labour was allocated to the construction of 
buildings to house an agricultural school. The rice 
produced by the company is sold in downtown 
Nanga Eboko. 
To date, the concession has not been granted 
although the procedure for requesting a land grant 
was initiated. According to the local Ministry of 
Agriculture, the review of the concession request is 
at an advanced stage and topographic surveys have 
been done in two main sites, one of which will be 
used for maize and cassava and the other for rice. 
 
It appears that the current 120 ha site had already 
been registered as State land during its use by 
the Taiwanese farm, and had been taken over by 
the Ministry of Agriculture. It appears that the 
State of Cameroon has now given away its private 
property to the Chinese agribusiness company. 
However, the question of compensation to local 
communities remains for the expropriation of the 
land that they were occupying. Some local residents 
interviewed believed that they had not received fair 
compensation, and were unwilling to abandon the 
graves and sacred grounds of their ancestors. 
The local Ministry of Environment claimed to 
have been refused access to the site to perform an 
environmental impact study, required by legislation. 
The various sites identified by the company are 
located mainly in gallery forests along the Sanaga 
River. In total, it has been estimated unofficially 
that investment in the Nanga Eboko project will 
total nearly US$60.5 million.
6. Chinese activities in the agricultural sector
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Figure 11. Agricultural map of Cameroon, showing the location of Nanga Eboko (red circle)
Source: FAO (2011)
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6.2 DR Congo
There has been a certain amount of Chinese 
investment in agricultural research and development 
through the years, the more famous of which include 
the above mentioned riziculture project, a fertiliser 
factory, and investment in the presidential model 
farm in N’Djili. Recently, there have been concerns 
about potential demands from Chinese investors for 
large-scale agricultural development, especially for 
biofuel production; however, such deals are often 
not as large nor as certain as they are rumoured to be 
(Brautigam 2009). The most famous such deal is the 
ZTE Agribusiness deal.
ZTE Agribusiness 
In 2007, a contract was signed between the 
Chinese telecommunications giant ZTE and the 
DRC Ministry of Agriculture to develop oil palm 
plantations, reportedly in abandoned plantations in 
Bandundu and Equateur.45 Rumours quickly spread 
that the deal was a US$1 billion investment for 3 
million ha. However, in reality the agreed area is 
100 000 ha, which the Ministry of Environment 
has yet to locate.46 One informant from an 
environmental NGO speculated that ZTE might 
be interested not just in oil palm, but may also be 
interested in acquiring some forest land in order 
to profit from timber sales prior to developing the 
plantations;47 however, this was not confirmed. 
There is evidence, however, that ZTE Agribusiness 
is serious about developing agriculture in DRC: it is 
one of the few Chinese companies to have invested 
through ANAPI in 2009, with US$4.4 million for 
‘farming’. Of this, the majority was likely invested 
to start a maize and soybean farm on the Plateau de 
Bateke and to conduct a pilot riziculture project at 
the presidential farm in N’sele.48
45 CIFOR interview with a Kinshasa-based US donor, 27 
July 2010, among others.
46 CIFOR interviews with a director of a Kinshasa-based 
international conservation NGO (1), 30 July 2010 and with 
a Kinshasa-based Chinese diplomat, 11 August 2010.
47 CIFOR interview with a director of a Kinshasa-based 
international conservation NGO (1), 30 July 2010.
48 See ‘Les chinois reprennent le site de la N’Sele L’Avenir’, 
3 March 2010. Available at: http://www.afriqueredaction.
com/article-agriculture-les-chinois-reprennent-le-site-de-la-n-
sele-47588654-comments.htm.
The ZTE Plateau de Bateke project near Kinshasa 
is a 256 ha farm producing maize on relatively 
degraded land. This year, it produced 2.7 tonnes per 
ha and sold it to the World Food Program. It also 
produced 10 tonnes of soy. The farm also produces 
meat, poultry and eggs, which are sold locally and 
in Kinshasa. All inputs and equipment are imported 
from China, including fertiliser, tractors, plows, 
harvesting machines, husking machines and flour 
mills.49
In our visit to the project, we were told that the land 
ZTE obtained is a 20-year contract between the 
company and the customary chief, who is also the 
chef de quartier, which prevents land conflicts. Some 
farms had been there before, and the villagers who 
lost their fields were not compensated; however, they 
were given new fields and allowed to harvest their 
crops before moving. The price paid to the chief was 
US$500 per ha as well as a package of goods called 
‘customary rights’ (droits coutumiers).50 
ZTE pays $2 per day for part time labour and up to 
$3.50. A driver might earn up to $180 per month. 
Doctors’ bills are paid if an employee gets sick or is 
injured on the job. Compared to other employers, 
this might be considered low compensation; 
according to workers on a farm nearby, payment 
for clearing land, by the hectare, is around $50. The 
company engages some 100 workers on a casual 
basis. Originally there were more workers (up to 150) 
to initially clear the land prior to the arrival of heavy 
equipment, but now there are likely only 20 to 25, 
along with around seven Chinese employees. Child 
labour is not used. At the beginning of the project 
about half of 15 drivers hired lost their jobs after two 
weeks with no pay because they could not produce a 
driver’s licence.51 
49 CIFOR interview with a DRC-based staff member of a 
Chinese state company, 17 July 2010.
50 CIFOR interviews with six informants, including former 
employees and people with knowledge of the details of the 
land deal, near the ZTE farm on the Plateau de Bateke, 17 
July 2010.
51 Ibid.
The purpose of this study was to gain a better 
understanding of the overall trends of Chinese 
trade and investment in the forestry, mining, and 
agricultural sectors of the Congo Basin. In order 
to achieve this, we selected Cameroon, DRC and 
Gabon as focal countries and conducted a scoping 
exercise, comprising document review, key informant 
interviews, and several field visits. The preliminary 
findings associated with this work are a composite 
of factual elements for which we were able to 
find evidentiary support, as well as the views of 
informants as presented to us in interviews. 
The Congo Basin’s mining and forestry sectors are 
both a major source of raw material imports to 
China, as well as a target for investment by Chinese-
owned firms. The configurations of commodity 
chains between Africa and China are numerous and 
complex, ranging from Chinese State investment in 
extraction, processing and trade to the involvement 
at any stage of production of numerous small actors 
of various ethnicities and nationalities operating 
independently. We argue that governance of trade 
impacts is primarily the responsibility of the producer 
State, but that the responsibility of Chinese buyers 
and investors increases with the importance of the 
resources acquired to the company or industry to 
which they are directed, and also with the potential 
for procurement of those materials to damage 
the environment and societies from which they 
are extracted. 
While investment in the highly strategic mineral 
sector is strongly backed by the Chinese State, in 
the timber sector activities are privately capitalised. 
In general, Chinese State investments in the mining 
sector take the form of conditional loans with 
infrastructure development provided by China 
against the collateral of a quantity of minerals to 
be extracted and exported by Sino-African joint 
ventures. Investments in the timber industry, 
meanwhile, are likely to be focused on the capital 
required for extraction, processing and transport. In 
Gabon, however, with the new SEZ in the works, any 
major investments could be seen as a swap for land, 
since investments in wood processing factories in the 
SEZ come with a timber concession thrown in. 
Over the next few years, the Chinese Government 
has committed to investing billions of dollars 
to mining in the DRC and Gabon and in both 
countries these are infrastructure-for-resources 
swaps. The terms of these deals are unclear, including 
the quantity of minerals involved. A potentially 
important question is whether the infrastructures 
proposed as partial payment for the minerals will be 
of high utility to the population as a whole, or if they 
will be especially useful for transporting the target 
resources out of the country and, as such, a de facto 
subsidy to the cost of the extraction and export. 
In Gabon, where Chinese logging concessions alone 
cover 10% of the forested area, the Government is 
trying to reform the forestry sector by enforcing a log 
export ban and requiring investment in processing. 
Over the next few years, it will be interesting to see if 
the investment in the processing industry comes, or if 
China’s demand for unprocessed wood shifts to other 
countries. To some degree this will depend on the 
development banks’ interest in financing the sector’s 
development. In 2009, the China Development 
Bank made a statement at the XIIIth World Forestry 
Congress suggesting a new interest in the foresty 
sector, but gave few details about its plans to invest 
in any specific country or in a particular stage of the 
commodity chain.52 
In the agricultural sector, China remains a source 
of financial and technical aid. Although still smaller 
and less developed than the other sectors, private 
investments in agribusiness projects are beginning to 
appear. However, unlike in the other sectors, private 
investment in agriculture does not appear to be 
export-oriented at this point, but this may change if 
Chinese companies get involved in producing cash 
crops such as palm oil, which is certainly a strong 
possibility. Selling produce from a Chinese farm in 
52 http://forum.cfm2009.org/e-forum/en/?no_cache=1&tx_
wecdiscussion[single]=259 (10 May 2011).
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DRC to the World Food Program, which has a policy 
of local purchasing, is particularly interesting, as it 
suggests an integration of the company within DRC’s 
national economy. In terms of its effect on local 
livelihoods, this might not be the most beneficial 
model, since it will neither bring foreign exchange 
nor increase Congolese ownership of capital. 
In terms of potential for deforestation and forest 
degradation, our overview leads to the following 
observations, by sector: 
1. The involvement of Chinese companies, 
particularly in the small-scale and artisanal 
segments of the mining sector, is potentially a 
significant source of deforestation and especially 
forest degradation in areas that attract large 
numbers of migrant diggers. In terms of large-
scale mining in DRC, the location of the major 
concession (DIMA) is generally in areas that were 
deforested long ago. In Gabon, however, it is not 
well known what the effect of development of the 
Belinga iron mine will be. 
2. In the forestry sector, Chinese companies have 
acquired substantial concessionary holdings 
in Gabon, some of which border on national 
parks. Our overview suggests that a need for 
more in-depth study of the activities of Chinese 
companies on the ground in Gabon, which 
vary greatly in their compliance to legislation 
and other responsibility norms; research would 
focus on their activities in the forest with their 
development and implementation of sustainable 
management plans. In all three countries, further 
study is needed of the articulations between 
Chinese companies and the informal timber 
sector, and a comparative approach is needed 
to determine the relative effects of the Chinese 
market and Chinese companies vs. other markets 
and non-Chinese companies. 
3. In the agricultural sector, Chinese investment has 
not reached a level where a substantial impact 
is to be expected. However, such investments 
are planned for the future, and may materialise 
over the next few years. The investment in 
Nanga Eboko would result in conversion of 
about 10 000 ha of mosaic farm and forestland 
(‘gallery forests’) to monocultural maize and rice 
production. In DRC, investment in 100 000 ha 
of oil palm is planned, the location of which is 
still unknown. 
In terms of economic contribution, Chinese 
investment and aid is important to the economies 
of the target countries, but still represents a small 
proportion of overall foreign investment. Much 
Chinese aid appears to be politically motivated, since 
it is targeted to projects identified by the head of 
State, and it is often also the executive branch that 
negotiates with China for large deals.
In terms of its social contribution, Chinese trade 
has a tendency to interface with small-scale local 
actors, such as artisanal miners and timber sellers, 
and therefore the benefits are likely to be distributed 
relatively widely. However, those benefits come with 
increased costs in the form of potential labour and 
even human rights abuses associated with vulnerable 
people being involved in dangerous industries 
conducted on a small scale with little oversight. In 
this regard, Chinese trade is no different from other 
foreign ethnic groups operating within the region. 
Chinese investment, meanwhile, is increasingly 
subject to the same kind of social and environmental 
safeguards as that of Western companies. 
Increasingly, Chinese investment banks require 
approved environmental and social assessments as 
well as mitigation plans. However, in several studies 
specifically targeting Chinese actors, poor labour 
practices such as low wages, long hours and bad 
working conditions abound. 
Further research needs
Further research is needed to measure the economic 
returns on Chinese investments, and to systematically 
assess their relative costs and benefits compared 
to other investors, including European, North 
American, South African and Australian companies, 
among others. Initial results point to a need to better 
understand the efficacy of national, provincial and 
local laws and institutions and customary systems—
including land and resource laws, investment 
promotion agencies and environmental oversight 
bureaus, and officials and local chiefs with authority 
to allocate land—in terms of ensuring the highest 
returns to society on investments while reducing 
and mitigating environmental and social costs. In 
addition, the responsibilities of investors in CB 
countries, including banks, corporations, and, where 
relevant, foreign governments, need to be better 
defined in forming and implementing guidelines on 
responsible finance and project implementation.
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In particular, questions that need to be asked in the 
next phase include: 
1. What are the strategies employed by Chinese 
investors to secure concessions and obtain 
permissions and approvals from the producer 
country’s national, provincial, and district 
governments and customary authorities? 
What are the livelihood impacts of such 
resource allocations?
2. How do Chinese companies articulate with the 
informal and small-scale sectors (e.g. timber 
and mining)? How do companies bypass formal 
approval processes by using alternative strategies 
(e.g. temporary extractive permits) to legitimise 
their status?
In answering this question, it will be important 
to obtain a comparative perspective, including 
what is different about Chinese companies’ 
behaviour compared with other groups. 
Attention should be paid to both the benefits and 
the costs of engagement with informal groups, 
in benefit flows to different actors, as well as 
differential effects on forest and tree cover. 
3. Do Chinese companies carry out the required 
environmental and social impact assessments 
and planning, and to what degree are they 
implemented? Are there differences between 
Chinese and non-Chinese companies and 
between large and small SOEs/private companies 
in this regard? What are the requirements of 
Chinese banking institutions in relation to 
environmental and social impacts and how are 
they enforced and verified?
Chinese vs. non-Chinese companies’ adherence 
to both local CdCs and international voluntary 
corporate social responsibility standards will also 
be assessed. 
4. What are the relationships between new Chinese 
and more longstanding non-Chinese investment 
partners in CB countries? Within landscapes 
containing the extractive activities of actors with 
different backgrounds, is there a differential 
degree of tree cover loss associated with the 
different groups? If so, what factors explain 
those differences? 
5. Is there a difference in terms of the species 
composition of Chinese timber imports? If so, 
what are the potential ecological ramifications?
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